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INTRODUCTION
Insurance is transacted in international commerce, and reinsurance is
an indispensable component of the business of insurance.' The persons
and business firms that place and service reinsurance are commonly
known as intermediaries. 2 Because insurance companies are quasi-public
financial institutions whose regulation is essential to the stability of
1. Insurance is a means to transfer the financial risk of a loss from the insured to the
insurer. Reinsurance provides the insurance company with the opportunity to spread its risks
and to increase its financial ability to write more new business by transferring a portion of its
financial obligations to the reinsurer(s), who in turn may transfer a portion of the risk to other
reinsurers. This process of reinsuring is referred to in the insurance business as ceding and
retrocession, respectively. The reinsured (or "cedent") cedes the business to the reinsurer who
assumes the financial consequences of the ceded business. A reinsurer of a reinsurer is a
"retrocessionnaire." See generally ROBERT C. REINARZ ET AL., REINSURANCE PRACTICES 17
(1st ed. 1990).
2. The term "intermediary" is derived from the French - interm6diaire - meaning one
that is intermediate, a mediator, an inter-agent, a go-between. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1180 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1986); OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 405 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds., 13th ed. 1989). For purposes of this
article, we use the generic term "intermediary" to identify all those who serve as agent or
broker in a reinsurance transaction. In common insurance parlance, a broker represents the
reinsured, while an agent represents the reinsurer. 1 BERNARD L. WEBB ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
REINSURANCE 45 (1st ed. 1990); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Stewart Smith Intermediaries, Inc.,
593 N.E.2d 872, 876 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992). Of course, both are "agents" within the meaning of
agency law. I WEBB, supra, at 45.
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domestic and foreign markets, 3 the regulation of reinsurance intermediar-
ies, both in the United States and abroad, is regarded as essential to the
preservation of insurance company solvency and the protection of a
failed insurer's creditors.
Although the fundamental rights, duties, and obligations of reinsur-
ance intermediaries in the United States have remained unchanged for
many years, recent regulatory, judicial, and industry pressures have
subjected them to unprecedented scrutiny.4 The greatest change has been
the enactment of comprehensive statutes regulating the licensure and
professional conduct of reinsurance intermediaries. These statutes, and
the regulations promulgated under them, seek to codify many of the
intermediary's traditional responsibilities. They have brought with them,
however, a new focus from start to finish on the relationships between
cedents, intermediaries, and reinsurers. Led by the State of New York
and the Natifnal Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a
number of states have passed comprehensive intermediary legislation
over the last four years.
Much has been written about the relative rights and duties of ce-
dents and reinsurers when an intermediary is bankrupt and about the
legal and financial consequences when an intermediary has placed
business with a reinsurer that fails financially. 5 Until recently, intermedi-
ary legislation and regulation focused on the problems presented by
bankrupt intermediaries. The current round of legislative and regulatory
reform, however, addresses intermediaries' rights and duties when a
cedent or reinsurer becomes insolvent. Perhaps because the law in this
area is new and developing, little has been written of intermediary
obligations in such circumstances. 6 The purpose of this article is to
advance that discourse by discussing intermediary rights and duties
3. Edward B. Rappaport, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report to Congress:
Insurance Company Solvency 1 (1989).
4. See, e.g., 1977-2 NAT'L ASs'N INS. COMMISSIONERS PROC. 416-21.
5. See John M. Sheffey, Reinsurance Intermediaries: Their Relationship to Reinsured
and Reinsurer, 16 FORUM 922 (1981); Harold M. Tract, Regulation 98: Muted Impact on
Liability, BEST'S REVIEW, Apr. 1984, at 48; Stacy Adler, Courts Differ on Intermediaries'
Status, Bus. INS., Oct. 31, 1988, at 74; Diane E. Burkley & Carol Ann Bischoff, Liability of
Agents, Brokers, and Intermediaries for Insurance Insolvency, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCY REVISITED 341 (Francine L. Semaya ed., 1989); Diane M.
Nash, Special Problems for Agents/Brokers Resulting from Insurance Company Insolvency, in
LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCY REVISITED, supra, at 783.
6. A recent article has provided part of the foundation of that discourse by summarizing
current legislative and regulatory initiatives undertaken to regulate the business of intermedi-
aries. See Debra J. Hall, The Emerging Regulation of Reinsurance Intermediaries, 42 DRAKE
L. REV. 859 (1993).
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under English and U.S. law. This article focuses on English and U.S.
law because of the comparatively large volume of reinsurance transac-
tions between the United States and the United Kingdom. As will be
seen, reinsurance is negotiated in an international market, with most
dollars passing between the United States and London. Each of those
jurisdictions has enacted legislation and promulgated regulations govern-
ing an intermediary's conduct of its business. These laws can and do
conflict. When a cedent or reinsurer fails in either country, the interme-
diary may find itself caught between conflicting laws in the two juris-
dictions - between rocks and hard places.
Accordingly, Part I of this article provides a review of the role
intermediaries have played in the recent spate of insurance company
insolvencies and an overview of intermediary rights and duties. Part II
then progresses to a discussion of English intermediary law, analyzing
how the general English rules apply to intermediaries when a cedent or
reinsurer becomes insolvent. Part III addresses the same issues under
U.S. law, tracing the most recent statutory developments from their
cause and considering their effect on reinsurance transactions. This
article concludes with a discussion of how English and U.S. law interact
in reinsurance transactions, pointing out how recent developments in
each jurisdiction necessarily affect the other.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Intermediaries Caught in the Middle of Insurer Insolvencies
Insurance companies around the world have been failing at what
many still regard to be an alarming rate. While this was perceived to be
a U.S. phenomenon in the 1980s, recent failures in London, Bermuda,
and Canada have highlighted what now is recognized to be a global
dilemma. Legislators and insurance regulators have conducted both
"macro" and "micro" studies of the problem and have proposed a flurry
of legislative initiatives and regulatory pronouncements designed to
prevent insurer insolvencies and lessen the impact of companies that
inevitably fail.7
7. See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM.
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, IOIST CONG., 2D SEss., FAILED PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPA-
NY INSOLVENCIES 2 (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter FAILED PROMISES]; S.B. 1091, Cal.
1995-96 Regular Sess., 1995 Cal. Laws (proposing an interstate compact for administering
insurer insolvencies); S.B. 534, 109th Regular Sess., 1995 Ind. Laws (same); S.B. 466, 88th
Gen. Assembly, 1995 Mo. Laws (same); L.B. 178, 94th Legis., First Sess., 1995 Neb. Laws
(same); S.B. 137, 1995 Regular Sess., 1995 N.H. Laws (same); H.B. 914, 74th Regular Sess.,
1995 Tex. Laws (same).
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Fearing another solvency crisis in U.S. financial institutions, a
number of congressional committees initiated investigations, convened
public hearings, and issued reports, addressing, among others, the issue
of whether the federal government should assume regulation of the
insurance industry.8 The most controversial investigations have been
conducted by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, chaired by Congressman
John D. Dingell (D. Mich.). In its 1990 report, Failed Promises: Insur-
ance Company Insolvencies (Failed Promises), the House Subcommittee
set forth its findings following a lengthy investigation of insurer insol-
vencies. Focusing primarily on the failures of four property and casualty
insurers, 9 the House Subcommittee found the following to be common
elements of financial failure: "rapid expansion, over-reliance on manag-
ing general agents, extensive and complex reinsurance arrangements,
excessive underpricing, reserve problems, false reports, reckless manage-
ment, gross incompetence, fraudulent activity, greed, and self dealing."'"
Recognizing the vital role that reinsurance plays in the solvency of
insurance compahies, the House Subcommittee was troubled by insur-
ance company managers' "excessive reliance on the judgment" of, and
delegation of "their most fundamental responsibilities" to, brokers and
other third parties who may have conflicting interests." The Subcommit-
tee was especially critical of state officials whose regulatory efforts
suffered from inadequate resources, lack of coordination, infrequent
regulatory examinations, poor information and communications, and
uneven implementation.'
2
Failed Promises closed with a series of questions about whether the
federal government should assume regulatory responsibility for the
business of insurance. 3 Four years later, the House Subcommittee issued
8. Since Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945, the states have had the
virtually preemptive right to regulate the "business of insurance." See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15
(1988).
9. Mission Insurance Company, Integrity Insurance Company, Transit Casualty Compa-
ny, and Anglo-American Insurance Company.
10. FAILED PROMISES, supra note 7, at 2; accord STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE
ON INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS.,
SECOND INTERIM REPORT ON U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO COMBAT FRAUD AND ABUSE IN
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: PROBLEMS WITH THE REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE AND
REINSURANCE INDUSTRY 16, 18 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter SECOND INTERIM SENATE
FRAUD REPORT].
11. FAILED PROMISES, supra note 7, at 3. The conflict lies in an agents' fiduciary
obligation to its principal and its own selfish desire for commissions generated by increased
business. hd at 10.
12. Id. at 4; SECOND INTERIM SENATE FRAUD REPORT, supra note 10, at 27.
13. FAILED PROMISES, supra note 7, at 75-76.
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its sequel to Failed Promises, titled Wishful Thinking: A World View of
Insurance Solvency Regulation.1 4 The majority of the House Subcommit-
tee concluded that federal intervention is both necessary and inevitable.
Recognizing that preserving solvency is both the original purpose and
first priority of insurer regulation, the Subcommittee articulated the
following "realistic formula for solvency regulation:" a focus on preven-
tion of insolvency, a commitment to bear the related costs, and imple-
mentation of appropriate regulatory systems to accomplish the preven-
tion of insolvency, i.e., national solvency standards, meaningful enforce-
ment, and control of alien1 5 insurers and reinsurers. The Subcommittee
also considered the role of insurance intermediaries and recommended
that state regulators:
closely inspect the qualifications and activities of independent
brokers and agents, especially those handling reinsurance and
surplus lines coverage.[16] Every significant property/casualty
company failure has involved extensive participation by such
intermediaries working on commissions, and they have been the
chief conduit for transferring policyholder funds to unsound and
unscrupulous destinations around the globe.1
7
14. STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON
ENERGY & COMMERCE, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., WISHFUL THINKING: A WORLD VIEW OF
INSURANCE SOLVENCY REGULATION (ComM. Print 1994) [hereinafter WISHFUL THINKING].
15. Most regulators and members of the United States insurance industry distinguish
between insurers on the basis of: (i) their legal form of ownership (e.g., proprietary, coopera-
tive, pools and associations, governmental, and "other"); (ii) their place of incorporation (i.e.,
domestic, foreign, and alien); (iii) their licensing status (i.e., licensed/admitted vs. unli-
censed/nonadmitted); and (iv) the type of their product and service distribution systems (i.e.,
independent agency, exclusive agency, direct writer, and mail order). See generally 1 WEBB,
supra note 2. A domestic insurer within any given state is an insurer that is incorporated
within, or formed under the laws of, that state. A foreign insurer is one incorporated in, or
formed under the laws of, another state. An alien insurer is one incorporated in or formed
under the laws of another country. Id. at 12.
16. A surplus lines company is not licensed to do business in the state. It is permitted to
operate in an unlicensed capacity on the assumption that it is providing coverage for expo-
sures that cannot be readily obtained in the market provided by admitted insurance compa-
nies. Regulation is accomplished by regulating the in-state broker who places the business
with the nonadmitted surplus lines company. Most state regulations provide that a surplus
lines broker placing business with an unlicensed surplus lines company must have a special
license, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5/445 (1992), and that the company with
which the business is placed, although unlicensed, be on a list of companies approved to do
surplus lines business in the state (called a "white list"). Surplus lines brokers are also
generally required to file information with the state insurance department every time business
is placed with an unlicensed company. Id. para. 5/445(5). In order for a surplus lines compa-
ny to remain on the approved list, the surplus lines broker sponsoring such a company may
be required to provide financial information about the insurer to the insurance department.
Some states do not have an approved list of surplus lines insurers. In these states, the broker
is responsible to exercise care in selecting the insurer. 2 Webb, supra note 2, at 167-68.
17. WISHFUL THINKING, supra note 14, at 14.
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Since Failed Promises was published, state regulators have worked
in earnest to forestall execution on congressional threats of federal
regulatory preemption by implementing state regulatory systems de-
signed to preserve the solvency of domestic insurers and reinsurers.
State insurance regulators have examined the events and persons identi-
fied by the federal government as causes of the "insolvency crisis" and
have focused particularly on reinsurance intermediaries. Accepting the
federal government's criticism that reinsurance is largely unregulated,
state regulators have responded by proposing increased legislation and
promulgating regulations to ensure that the people who place reinsur-
ance and administer claims - the intermediaries - are sufficiently
monitored to ensure the solvency of both cedents and reinsurers.
B. Overview of the Rights and Duties of Reinsurance Intermediaries
1. Business Practices
Intermediaries are the "middlemen" in reinsurance transactions."
Heifetz aptly describes the intermediary's role:
[Intermediaries] bring buyer and seller together. Within this frame-
work, the intermediary assumes many roles, at times the inquisitor,
the devil's advocate, the diplomat, the referee, the accounting
expert, the tax expert, the industry bellwether, the broad shoulder,
the father confessor and, every once in a while, the fall guy.
An intermediary's function in the reinsurance transaction process
can be divided chronologically into six different parts - contact,
survey, conceptualization, authorization, placement and service.' 9
"Contact" refers to the first step in any brokered business transac-
tion: the identification (through research) of a business opportunity and
the business broker's initial communication with one of the parties.
"Survey" describes the intermediary's identification of the client's
reinsurance needs. In a reinsurance transaction,, it begins with a "limits
18. Leo T. Heifetz, The Role of the Intermediary, in INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTI-
TUTE, REINSURANCE: FUNDAMENTALS AND NEW CHALLENGES 31 (2d ed. 1989).
19. Id.; see also 1 WEBB, supra note 2, at 22. The intermediary brings together a primary
insurer and a reinsurer and assists them in negotiating one or more reinsurance agreements.
The intermediary then acts as a conduit between reinsured and reinsurer for transmitting
money and information. Intermediaries often provide other services, such as underwriting
advice, suggestions for claims administration or reserving, and setting reinsurance retentions
and limits. Id. at 22, 29; accord Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 526 F. Supp. 623, 625 n.2 (D. Neb.
1980); Capital Indem. Corp., 593 N.E.2d at 876.
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profile," typically including a description of the principal's underwriting
practices; premium rate filings; claims administration; distribution of
business (by line of business,2' territory, and limits); expenses; financial
data; existing reinsurance and management's attitude toward assumption
of risk; analysis of the company's risk-bearing capabilities; and future
business plans. "Conceptualization" refers to the broker's identification
of the client's needs and recommendations on how they may be filled.
"Authorization" is the client's agreement that the broker may act for it.
"Placement" describes the broker's search for an appropriate reinsurer.
"Service" encompasses the full execution of the contract, from signature
through performance.2
2. Legal Duties
As a matter of law, a reinsurance intermediary's principal right is to
receive compensation, usually through brokerage commissions and
investments on funds held, for efforts expended on behalf of the princi-
pal. In return, the intermediary traditionally has owed the following
duties to the principal:
1. to make reasonable inquiry about the financial strength of the
proposed reinsurer;
2. to effect the desired cession;.
3. to transmit promptly funds and communications between the
cedent and reinsurer; and
4. to account properly for all funds received or transmitted. 22
In other words, there are three broad categories of financial duties owed
by reinsurance intermediaries: security, care and loyalty, and accounting.
These legal duties generally fall in Heifetz's descriptions of the "place-
ment" and "service" functions.
Before an intermediary is engaged to transact reinsurance business,
he must provide security for his performance. Such security is provided
by licensure, a contract or letter of engagement, fidelity bonds, and
errors and omissions coverage.
Engagement triggers an intermediary's second duty, care and loyal-
ty. This duty requires the intermediary to determine which reinsurers are
capable of meeting financial obligations owed to the cedent, and which
20. A "line of business" is a type of insurance written, e.g., burglary and theft, glass, etc.
See generally 1 WEBB, supra note 2, at 64-65.
21. Heifetz, supra note 18, at 31-36.
22. See generally Sheffey, supra note 5, at 923-24; see also 1 WEBB, supra note 2, at
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cedents have underwritten risks compatible with the assuming reinsur-
er's program. On the one hand, this entails an obligation by the interme-
diary to analyze the financial security of unauthorized reinsurers. This
frequently has been termed the duty of inquiry. Although new regula-
tions still do not go so far as to make an intermediary a guarantor of a
reinsurer's solvency, they do impose obligations to investigate the
financial health of unauthorized reinsurers. Moreover, it has been sug-
gested that intermediaries will' be expected to monitor the performance
of assuming reinsurers.23 Increasing liability for failure to ascertain a
reinsurer's ability to perform' provides an incentive for intermediaries
to dedicate resources to analyzing the relative strength of reinsurers.
Equally important is an intermediary's duty to provide clear commu-
nication, sometimes labelled the duty to disclose. Intermediaries must
understand both the nature of a cedent's reinsurance needs and a rein-
surer's requirements in order to be able to formulate and communicate
clearly the terms of the proposed cession. Failure to perform this func-
tion properly may lead to rescission25 of the reinsurance treaty or facul-
tative certificate (collectively, the "reinsurance contract").26 Once the
proposed cession has been approved in principle, the intermediary has a
related duty to document the transaction. This obligation frequently
includes the drafting, circulation, and execution of reinsurance contracts,
as well as the maintenance of complete records even after the relation-
ship is terminated.
Execution of the reinsurance contract triggers an intermediary's third
duty, to account. In general, the intermediary has a duty to handle funds
received in a fiduciary capacity on the principal's behalf. State regula-
tors have begun demanding strict adherence to requirements for the
maintenance and payment of reinsurance funds. The industry is demand-
ing increasingly that intermediaries provide sophisticated administrative
services to ensure that collections can be effected promptly. Because an
intermediary is the conduit through whom claims information flows, he
23. See, e.g., Thomas J. Kennedy, Intermediaries Under Siege, BEST'S REVIEW, Mar.
1992, at 45.
24. See generally Burkley & Bischoff, supra note 5.
25. See, e.g., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 526 F. Supp. 623 (D. Neb.
1980).
26. Reinsurance transactions are usually classified, by the method of underwriting, into
two types: facultative and treaty. In facultative reinsurance, each risk is usually underwritten
individually. The primary insurer has no obligation to submit any risks to the reinsurer, and
the reinsurer is free to accept or reject any risks submitted. Under treaty reinsurance, the
reinsurer generally underwrites an entire class or portfolio of risks. Individual risks of the
primary insurer that come within the treaty contract conditions are automatically reinsured. 1
WEBB, supra note 2, at 147; Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 526 F. Supp. at 626 n.5, 628 n.8.
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also is expected to develop and maintain claims departments capable of
securing such collection.27 This frequently means that intermediaries
must retain experts to resolve complex reinsurance claims and disputes.
The three duties of intermediaries - security, care and loyalty, and
accounting - arise at different times, but are cumulative in nature and
effect. For example, the duty to provide security is the intermediary's
initial duty, but it is one that increases over time, as do each of the
other duties. As demonstrated below, it has become increasingly difficult
in today's marketplace for intermediaries to perform their duties. The
most recently implemented statutory and regulatory controls of their
performance are founded upon common law agency principles and
designed to alleviate the difficulties encountered in many insurer receiv-
erships.
II. ENGLISH LAW GOVERNING REINSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES
English law governing the relationships between cedents, intermedi-
aries, and reinsurers derives from the common law of agency and con-
tract, as well as from statute.
A. Agency
The general rule is that a reinsurance intermediary serves as the
cedent's agent.28 However, in certain circumstances (e.g., in connection
with the adjustment and settlement of claims), an intermediary may act
as the reinsurer's agent or as agent of both the cedent and reinsurer.29
An intermediary is prohibited from acting on behalf of both the cedent
and reinsurer, however, unless he obtains the prior, informed consent of
both parties after disclosure of all material facts.30
Like other agents, reinsurance intermediaries owe their principals the
duty to exercise reasonable care and skill and the duty of loyalty. As
27. See 1 WEBB, supra note 2, at 22, 29.
28. Rozanes v. Bowen, 32 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 98 (C.A. 1928).
29. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. General Accident Assurance Corp., 12 S.L.T. 348
(1904) (where reinsurer exercises sufficient control over intermediary, intermediary is
reinsurer's agent); Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher (No. 1), [1989] 1 All. E.R. 402
(H.L.) (broker acting in dual agency capacity is authorized to receive communications on
reinsurer's behalf). But see Pryke v. Gibbs Hartley Cooper Ltd., [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 602,
615 ("It may be possible for an agent by express agreement to place himself in the position in
which he does act for two parties, but a custom to the effect that he is compelled to act in
conflict or for two masters is not enforceable in law.") (citing Anglo African Merchants Ltd.
v. Bayley, [1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 268, [1970] 1 Q.B. 311; North and South Trust Co. v.
Berkeley, [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 467, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 470).
30. Pryke, [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 615; see also JOHN S. BUTLER & ROBERT M.
MERKIN, REINSURANCE LAW D.3.1-07 (15th ed. 1992) [hereinafter BUTLER & MERKIN].
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part of the duty to exercise care and skill, intermediaries are bound to
investigate the financial health of a reinsurance company before ceding
risk to that company.3 As part of the duty of loyalty, intermediaries are
not permitted to make a secret profit from transactions involving the
cedent, although they are entitled to be compensated for their services.32
This compensation typically is obtained by deducting a commission
from premium payments.
An intermediary's duty to account is fairly settled in English law. In
the reinsurance context, the intermediary receives premiums and claims
for transmission to cedents and reinsurers. In handling those funds, the
intermediary must:
1. act with due diligence in collecting amounts and.., pay over
any sum received in his employment in accordance with the
arrangements agreed with his principal.
2. render an account when required.
3. keep his principal's property distinct from his own.
4. not... make any profit beyond the commission or remunera-
tion paid by his principal.33
In most cases, the intermediary/cedent relationship is not governed
directly by the terms of a reinsurance contract between the cedent and
reinsurer; rather, the intermediary and his principal have a separate and
distinct agreement. Moreover, since the intermediary is not bound by the
reinsurance contract, he cannot sue in his own name to enforce it.'
Similarly, third parties cannot sue an intermediary on a reinsurance
contract made on behalf of a cedent or reinsurer.35 However, an interme-
diary who effects reinsurance in his own name without disclosing the
existence or identity of the cedent may sue for and recover in his own
name the full amount of the cedent's loss under the reinsurance contract
and eventually may be liable to transfer any funds recovered to the
31. Osman v. J. Ralph Moss Ltd., [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 313 (C.A.).
32. R.W. HODGIN, INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES: LAW AND REGULATION 2.27-2.35
(1992).
33. R.L. CARTER, REINSURANCE 153 (2d ed. 1983). Also, intermediaries typically earn
investment income on premiums and claim payments held before distribution to reinsurers and
cedents.
34. F.M.B. REYNOLDS, BOWSTEAD ON AGENCY art. 104 (15th ed. 1985) [hereinafter
BOWSTEAD].
35. Id.
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cedent.36 Furthermore, a reinsurer sued by an intermediary in his own
name may be able to defend against the suit on the basis that it has paid
the cedent, that the cedent has intervened and demanded payment or
sued, or that the intermediary's authority to sue was terminated.37
An intermediary's authority to act on a cedent's behalf terminates
under certain circumstances. 3' For example, subject to a contrary agree-
ment, an intermediary's authority is to a considerable extent revoked if
the cedent becomes insolvent, unless the intermediary is unaware of the
insolvency. 39 Thus, an intermediary who is unaware of a cedent's insol-
vency may continue to pay a reinsurer; if the intermediary is aware of
the insolvency, he has no authority to do so. Similarly, a reinsurer's
payments of losses or return premiums to an intermediary who knows of
the cedent's insolvency do not constitute payment to the cedent unless
the reinsurer is unaware of the insolvency. 4° An intermediary's bankrupt-
cy will not affect his ability to act on a cedent's behalf unless the agen-
cy agreement provides otherwise 41
An intermediary's authority to act on a cedent's behalf may be
expressed in an agency agreement or implied under common law. To
determine the scope of an intermediary's express authority, reference
should be made to the terms of his agency agreement, as well as to
other facts and circumstances surrounding the relationship. The implied
authority of an intermediary to act on a cedent's behalf is determined
principally by reference to the customs and usages of'the reinsurance
marketplace.
1. Custom and Usage
An intermediary has implied authority to act on a cedent's behalf
according to reasonable customs and usages of the reinsurance market,
or other customs and usages of which the cedent has notice and that the
cedent adopts at the time the agent's authority is conferred. 42 The theory
underlying this proposition is that if a practice becomes uniform and
accepted; then conformity with that practice becomes an implied term of
the agency agreement. 43 Many customs in the English reinsurance mar-
36. Id. art. 105.
37. IM
38. See generally id. arts. 124-128.
39. Id. art. 127.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. art. 31.
43. BUTLER & MERKIN, supra note 30, D.3.4-05; see also BOWSTEAD, supra note 34, art.
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ket have been evolving over two centuries, particularly in relation to a
cedent's obligation to pay premiums and the netting of accounts.
a. Premiums
As a matter of custom, reinsurance contracts covering marine risks
are viewed differently than reinsurance contracts covering other risks.
Under the former, the intermediary - not the cedent - is personally
liable to the reinsurer for premiums. This obligation has existed for
almost two hundred years. 44 Universo Ins. Co. of Milan v. Merchants
Marine Ins. Co.41 is a case in point. There, an intermediary became
bankrupt after receiving from the cedent premium funds under a marine
reinsurance contract before they were paid to the reinsurer. The reinsurer
sued the cedent to recover the funds. Relying upon the custom prevail-
ing in the marine reinsurance market, the court held that the reinsurer's
action must fail. Mr. Justice Parke explained' the theory underlying the
custom sixty-eight years earlier:
By the course of dealing, the broker has an account with the under-
writer [i.e., the reinsurer]; in that account the broker gives the
underwriter credit for the premium when the policy is effected, and
he, as the agent of both the assured and the underwriter, is consid-
ered as having paid the premium to the underwriter, and the latter
as having lent it to the broker again, and so becoming his credi-
tor."
Ten years after Milan, the custom was codified as Section 53(1) of the
Marine Insurance Act of 1906 - "[u]nless otherwise agreed, where a
marine policy is effected on behalf of the assured by a broker, the
broker is directly responsible to the insurer for the premium."
Like the marine reinsurance market, Lloyd's custom obligates the
intermediary - not the cedent - to pay premiums under reinsurance
contracts underwritten by Lloyd's syndicates.47 In other words, the
intermediary stands in the shoes of, and is treated as though he were,
the cedent. The custom has been justified because the intermediary (i.e.,
40. It is not unusual for established practices in the marketplace to be pleaded as trade custom
and usage by parties to legal actions.
44. Edgar v. Bumstead, 1 Camp. 411 (C.P. 1808).
45. [1897] 2 Q.B. 93.
46. Power v. Butcher, 10 B. & C. 329, 347 (K.B. 1829).
47. Julien Praet et Cie., S/A v. H.G. Poland Ltd., (1960] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 420, 433 ("It is
an integral part of the Lloyd's system that where a firm of Lloyd's Brokers present a risk and
have it accepted by an Underwriter, they make themselves responsible for the payment of the
premium, whether or not they receive it from their client.").
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Lloyd's broker) is known to the reinsurer, while the reinsurer usually
does not know the cedent.
48
Litigants unsuccessfully have tried to persuade courts to extend the
Lloyd's custom to nonmarine reinsurance contracts underwritten outside
of Lloyd's. 49 In Wilson v. Avec Audio-Visual Equip. Ltd.,50 an insurer
failed and its liquidator demanded payment of earned premiums arising
under a nonmarine insurance policy underwritten outside of Lloyds. The
intermediary paid the earned premiums to the liquidator and then sought
indemnification from the insured. The insured refused, however, to
indemnify the intermediary for premiums earned post-insolvency. The
intermediary argued that custom required him to pay the premiums to
the insurer's estate and that he had a right to be indemnified by his
principal, the insured. The court rejected the intermediary's argument,
applying the general rule that intermediaries are not personally liable
under contracts made on behalf of their principals and held in the in-
sured's favor. The court also relied upon a letter written by the insured
withdrawing the intermediary's authority to pay the premiums.
The breadth of Wilson's application is unknown. The case could be
distinguished easily if the intermediary's authority were never revoked.
In fact, the court stated that the custom may apply to non-Lloyd's,
nonmarine policies if "clear and precise evidence of a very special
relationship before an agent can be rendered personally liable in respect
of a contract entered into on behalf of his principal" is presented.51
Moreover, Wilson may not apply to reinsurance contracts. Thus, the
custom could apply in the reinsurance context if it were established that
the intermediary's obligation to pay premiums met requirements of
reasonableness, certainty, and universal acceptance.52
b. Net Accounting
Absent a usage or custom, an intermediary has implied authority to
receive payments only in cash.53 To the extent a reinsurer pays an
intermediary cash and the intermediary fails to pass on the money to the
cedent, the cedent is not entitled to recover the cash from the reinsurer,
because cash payment to the intermediary constitutes payment to the
cedent5 4
48. Universo Ins. Co. of Milan v. Merchants Marine Ins. Co., [1897] 2 Q.B. 93, 99.
49. Wilson v. Avec Audio-Visual Equip. Ltd., [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 81.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 83.
52. BOWSTEAD, supra note 34, art. 40 ("In order to establish the existence of a custom or
usage [it must be shown] that the alleged custom is (i) reasonable, (ii) universally accepted by
the trade or profession . . ., (iii) certain and (iv) not unlawful." (footnotes omitted)).
53. Id. art. 28.
54. Scott v. Irving, I B. & Ad. 605 (K.B. 1830); see also Trading & Gen. Inv. Corp. v.
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Lloyd's intermediaries and underwriters typically enter into net
accounting agreements under which they offset premiums and losses
under multiple contracts on a regular basis and account to one another
for the balance.5 This practice has developed into a Lloyd's custom.56
However, the practice of net accounting under multiple contracts has not
yet risen to the level of a custom for policies underwritten outside of
Lloyd's. 57
Although net accounting is a Lloyd's custom, a cedent is not bound
by the consequences that flow from it unless the cedent knows of and
adopts its use. Scott v. Irving is a case in point. 8 In Scott, a Lloyd's
broker and Lloyd's underwriter had a net accounting agreement. The
underwriter owed the policyholder £100 in losses and the broker owed
the underwriter £46 in premiums. In accordance with their net account-
ing agreement, the underwriter paid £54 to the broker, deducting the £46
owed to it. The broker became bankrupt before paying the policyholder.
The underwriter argued that its obligation to the policyholder was
discharged upon the payment of £54 to the broker in view of the set-off
against premiums due from the broker. The court disagreed, however,
holding that a policyholder is not bound by a net accounting agreement
of which he is unaware. The court required the underwriter to pay the
policyholder £46, reasoning that payment to the broker of the £54 in
cash constituted payment to the policyholder. The court noted, however,
that the result would be different where the policyholder "knows there is
a certain accustomed course of dealing between the broker and the
underwriter, and is willing to adopt it, whatever it may be."'59 The same
principles also apply to the reinsurance market.60
Gault Armstrong & Kemble Ltd., [1986] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 195, 200 ("The cases [hold] that if
an agent authorized to receive cash from a third party chooses not to receive cash but to give
the third party credit, then the agent may be estopped from denying that he has received the
cash or may ... be treated as having received the money and lent it to the third party.").
55. See generally BUTLER & MERKIN, supra note 30, D.3.4-1 1.
56. Scott, 1 B. & Ad. at 605.
57. Sweeting v. Pearce, 9 C.B. (N.S.) 534, 535 (Ex. Ch. 1861) ("a usage of Lloyd's
could not be taken to be a general usage of the trade of London, but only the usage of one
house .... ) (citing Gabay v. Lloyd, 3 B. & C. 793).
58. 1 B. & Ad. 605 (K.B. 1830).
59. Id. at 611; see also Matvieff v. Crosfield, 8 Com. Cas. 120 (1903) (court refused to
bind insured to net accounting agreement between broker and insurer, despite fact that insured
had considerable insurance knowledge and became a Lloyd's member before trial); Sweeting,
9 C.B. (N.S.) at 534 (ship-builder, insured, not bound by net accounting agreement between
Lloyd's broker and Lloyd's underwriter, despite fact that jury found usage to be generally
known to merchants and policy was effected in broker's name, where ship-builder was
unaware of usage); Stewart v. Aberdein, 4 M. & W. 211 (Ex. Ch. 1903) (assured was
cognizant of and authorized net accounting agreement and thus was bound by it).
60. See Provincial Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Crowder, 27 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 28, 30-31 (1927)(cedent not bound by net accounting practice between Lloyd's intermediary and Lloyd's
underwriter).
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2. Sub-agency
Sub-agency involves the delegation of an intermediary's authority or
the appointment of a third party to act on the cedent's behalf. Sub-
agency is becoming more common in the London reinsurance market
because Lloyd's has recognized the need to permit intermediaries not
registered with Lloyd's to have access to its underwriters. As one com-
mentator noted, "[w]ith the growth of the Lloyd's market into areas
other than marine, aviation and other large commercial risks, the market
practice has had to adapt ... ."61 In the last few years, Lloyd's has
opened its doors to non-Lloyd's intermediaries, permitting underwriters
to accept business introduced to them by sources from all over the
world.62 Thus, the increasingly competitive nature of reinsurance likely
will result in English courts having to resolve complex issues that arise
in transactions involving more than one intermediary.
As a general rule, an intermediary may not delegate his authority or
appoint a sub-intermediary to do any act on the cedent's behalf, except
with the cedent's express or implied authority.63 The reason is obvious:
"the risks of agency are substantial, and a person has a right not to be
represented, save at his own election and by an intermediary of his own
choice." 64 Several consequences follow from the general rule: (i) actions
of a sub-intermediary appointed without the cedent's permission are
invalid; (ii) payments by a third party to the sub-intermediary do not
bind the cedent; (iii) the cedent is not liable to the putative sub-interme-
diary for commission; (iv) the sub-intermediary does not have any lien
against the cedent's property; and (v) the intermediary may be liable to
the cedent for money received by the sub-intermediary.65
In addition, the intermediary may be liable to the cedent for the sub-
intermediary's defaults resulting from the sub-intermediary's own negli-
gence:
The broker will thus face liability if his selection of the sub-broker
was negligent, if he has failed to monitor the activities of the sub-
broker or if he has participated in the sub-broker's negligent con-
61. HODGIN, supra note 32, 5.16(ii).
62. See, e.g., Lloyd's Byelaw No. 6 of 1988: Umbrella Arrangements, as amended;
Lloyd's Byelaw No. 8 of 1990: Insurance Intermediaries Byelaw, as amended; Lloyd's
Regulation No. 3 of 1990: Insurance Intermediaries Regulation, as amended; Lloyd's Regula-
tion No. 4 of 1990: Approval of Correspondents.
63. See generally BOWSTEAD, supra note 34, art. 35.
64. Id. (quoting PHILIP MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY 50 (4th ed. 1952)).
65. See id.
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duct. The sub-broker is not, however, the employee of the broker
so that the broker does not bear general vicarious liability for the
misconduct of the sub-broker."
The Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 ensures that an intermediary
who is liable to a cedent for a sub-intermediary's default has a right of
contribution from the sub-intermediary. 7
As a general rule, a sub-intermediary has no duty to account to a
cedent, and the cedent cannot sue the sub-intermediary in contract or for
money had and received because there is no privity of contract.6 How-
ever, "[t]he present position as to the rules of law affecting the sub-
agent in England is not ... as firmly fixed as might appear. '69 There is
some authority for the general proposition that a sub-intermediary may
be a fiduciary of the cedent, and in appropriate cases the sub-intermedi-
ary may be ordered to account to the cedent.70 For example, a sub-
intermediary's failure to pay funds he has promised to the cedent may
create a right of action in the cedent's favor against the sub-intermedi-
ary. Thus, if a cedent, A, is owed money by an intermediary, B, and B is
owed money by a sub-intermediary, C, A will have a right of action
against C for funds held by C if B has informed A that C will pay those
funds to A and C also has promised to make that payment.71
In any event, a sub-intermediary may be liable in tort to a cedent.
Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd.72 supports the proposition that a
sub-intermediary's negligence which causes the cedent to suffer foresee-
able loss may give rise to a cause of action in the cedent's favor.73
B. Contract
In addition to common law agency principles, relationships between
intermediaries, cedents, and reinsurers are- governed by common law
contract principles. Thus, an intermediary must perform the duties set
forth in his agency agreement with the cedent. in addition, the interme-
diary, although not a party to it, should be aware of provisions of the
reinsurance contract between the cedent and reinsurer because he is the
66. BUTLER & MEMuN, supra note 30, D.3.1-10.
67. Id.
68. BOWSTEAD, supra note 34, art. 36.
.69. Id.
70. Id
71. Griffin v. Weatherby, L.R. 3 Q.B. 753, 758 (action for money had and received); see
also Shamia v. Joory, [1958] 1 Q.B. 448, 457 (same).
72. [1983] 1 A.C. 520.
73. BUTLER & MERKIN, supra note 30, D.3.4-22.
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conduit for information and payments. English reinsurance contracts
typically include an "intermediary clause," which provides that all
communications and all premiums, losses, and return premiums must be
made by the parties through the intermediary.74 Unlike the U.S. version
of the "intermediary clause, 75 this clause does not place the risk of the
intermediary's insolvency on the reinsurer.
English reinsurance contracts typically differ from U.S. contracts in
at least one other material respect. In the United States, reinsurance
contracts include an "insolvency clause, 76 which requires that a reinsur-
er's liability to a cedent is not diminished in the event of the cedent's
insolvency.77 No such provision is to be found in most English reinsur-
ance contracts, although there is little practical difference in how Eng-
lish law views a reinsurer's obligations. A reinsurer's obligation to pay
losses does not diminish despite the fact that the cedent is insolvent and
unable to meet its policyholder obligations in full.7 However, a reinsur-
er's obligations may be diminished if the reinsurance contract provides
that the reinsurer's liability to the cedent will be no greater than the
losses actually paid by the cedent to its policyholders.7 ,
C. Insolvency
The distinction between the obligations owed by intermediaries in
marine and Lloyd's business and the obligations owed for other busi-
ness 0 is acute when either the cedent, intermediary, or reinsurer is
insolvent.8' In addition, problems presented by premium payment obliga-
tions, net accounting between an intermediary and a reinsurer, set-offs,
and intermediary funding become apparent in the event of an insol-
vency. 2 This article considers each in turn below.
In England, the laws relating to company insolvency have been
consolidated by the Insolvency Act 1986, the Insolvency Rules 1986,
74. Id. D.3.4-13.
75. See infra part III.B.
76. See infra part III.C.
77. Id.
78. Home & Overseas Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Mentor Ins. Co. (U.K.) Ltd. (1988) (unpublished,
on file with the author); In re Eddystone Marine Ins. Co. (Ltd.), [1892] 2 Ch. 423; Re Law
Guarantee Trust & Acc. Soc'y Ltd. v. Liverpool Mortgage Ins. Co., [19141 2 Ch. 617; In re
a Company (No. 0013734 of 1991), cited in Liability of the Reinsurer to Pay Reinsured After
Its Solvency, THE TIMES (London), May 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Times
File.
79. Nepean v. Marten, 11 T.L.R. 256 (1895).
80. See supra part II.A.1.
81. See generally BUTLER & MERKIN, supra note 30, D.3.4-06 to 07.
82. See infra part II.C.
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and the Companies Act 1985. These statutes and rules set forth several
insolvency procedures for companies, such as administration, administra-
tive receivership, voluntary arrangements, schemes of arrangement, and
liquidation.83 In addition, in England there is specific legislation relating
to insurer insolvency, including the Insurance Companies Act 1982,
Insurance Companies Winding-Up Rules 1985, and Policyholders Pro-
tection Act 1975.4 This comprehensive legislative scheme solves many
legal problems that arise in the context of insurer/reinsurer insolvencies.
However, the issues discussed below for the most part may be resolved
only by reference to the common law principles articulated in Parts II.A
and II.B. supra.
1. Premiums
An analysis of the relative rights and duties of parties to a reinsur-
ance transaction upon the insolvency or bankruptcy of one of those
parties illustrates the significance of the customs and usages discussed in
Part II.A.1 supra. The reinsurance intermediary often will find himself
at a financial disadvantage when one of the parties to a marine or
Lloyd's reinsurance transaction becomes insolvent. This is not neces-
sarily the case when a party to any other type of reinsurance transaction
becomes insolvent.
The consequences of parties entering into net accounting agreements
affects who must bear the risk of another's insolvency. For example, if
a Lloyd's intermediary and Lloyd's reinsurer engage in net accounting,
and the reinsurer owes the cedent £1000 in treaty losses, and the inter-
mediary owes the reinsurer £500 in premiums under the same treaty,
then the reinsurer would net those amounts and pay the intermediary
only £500. The intermediary, in turn, would send the £500 to the cedent.
These facts should not present a problem when all of the parties are
solvent. Questions arise, however, when one of them becomes insolvent.
First, assume that a cedent becomes insolvent before it pays its
intermediary premiums under a reinsurance contract. If the reinsurance
covers marine risks or is underwritten in Lloyd's, it follows from the
83. See Debra J. Anderson, et al., Amreco: A Step Towards International Rehabilitations,
7 J. INs. REG. 388 (1989) [hereinafter Amreco], for a general discussion of the English
statutes applicable to reinsurance insolvency. The detailed aspects of English insolvency
proceedings are governed by the rules promulgated under the Insolvency Act 1986. Insolven-
cy Rules 1986, S.I. 1986, No. 1925, as amended by the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 1987,
S.I. 1987, No. 1919 and S.I. 1989, No. 397; see generally Amreco, supra, at 407 n.75.
84. See Stephen W. Schwab, et al., Cross-Border Insurance Insolvencies: The Search for
a Forum Concursus, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 303, 341 (1991), for a discussion of the
applicability of those statutes to reinsurance.
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general rules articulated above85 that the intermediary is liable to the
reinsurer for the premiums and the reinsurer is liable to the insolvent for
losses. The intermediary's only remedy is to claim against the insol-
vent's estate for indemnification.86 However, if the reinsurer pays losses
to the intermediary, to be passed on to the insolvent's estate, the inter-
mediary may be able to reduce his claim by the amount of those losses.
If the intermediary has paid the premiums to the'reinsurer, then it may
be argued that the intermediary is subrogated to the rights of the reinsur-
er and may deduct the amount of premiums owed to him before trans-
mitting the balance of the losses to the cedent's receiver. Thus, in
Orakpo v. Manson Inv. Ltd.,87 Lord Salmon held that:
The test as to whether the courts will apply the doctrine of subro-
gation to the facts of any particular case is entirely empirical. It
is ... impossible to formulate any narrower principle than that the
doctrine will be applied only when the courts are satisfied that
reason and justice demand that it should be.
If, however, the reinsurance does not cover marine risks and is not
underwritten in Lloyd's, the reifisurer will be able to reduce loss pay-
ments by the amount of premiums owed to it, before the reinsurer pays,
or files a claim against the insolvent estate for, the balance.88
Second, assume that an intermediary becomes bankrupt after receiv-
ing premiums from the cedent under reinsurance covering marine risks
or underwritten in Lloyd's and before transmitting those funds to the
reinsurer. The cedent is not liable to the reinsurer for the premiums, and
the reinsurer's only recourse is to file an unsecured creditor's claim
against the intermediary's estate.89 However, if the reinsurance does not
cover marine risks and is underwritten outside of Lloyd's, the cedent
remains liable to the reinsurer for the premiums and the cedent should
seek to recover the previously paid funds from the bankrupt estate. In
this respect, the cedent will be aided by the proprietary remedy of
tracing, but only to the extent that the previously paid funds are readily
identifiable.90
85. See supra part II.A.I.
86. See infra part II.C.2.
87. [1978] A.C. 95, 110.
88. BUTLER & MERKaN, supra note 30, D.3.4-09.
89. Id. D.3.4-06.
90. See BOWSTEAD, supra note 34, art. 94(1) ("On the bankruptcy of the agent, the
principal is entitled, as against the trustee in bankruptcy and creditors of the bankrupt, to all
outstanding debts due to the bankrupt as his agent, and to recover and trace all money and
property held by the bankrupt as his agent .. "). Tracing has been defined as involving "the
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Finally, assume that the reinsurer becomes insolvent before the
intermediary has paid premiums in his possession to the reinsurer. If the
reinsurance covers marine risks or is underwritten at Lloyd's, the inter-
mediary is liable to pay the premiums to the reinsurer's receiver and the
intermediary must seek indemnification from the cedent. The cedent, in
turn, may recover losses owed to it by filing an unsecured creditor's
claim against the reinsurer's estate. 91 However, if the reinsurance does
not cover marine risks and is not underwritten in Lloyd's, the cedent
may apply the premiums to reduce the- loss payments owed by the
reinsurer: If the loss payments are greater in value than the premiums,
the cedent must file an unsecured creditor's claim against the reinsurer's
estate for the balance.92 Finally, if the premiums exceed the losses, the
cedent must pay the balance into the reinsurer's estate. 93
2. Set-Offs
Despite the prevalent.involvement of intermediaries in reinsurance
transactions, little attention has been paid to the issue of whether and to
what extent set-offs may be. asserted between an insurer and a reinsurer
- one of whom is insolvent - when one or both of them was repre-
sented by an intermediary. This lack of attention is surprising in view of
the magnitude of the financial consequences that may attend the asser-
tion of set-off rights. It is not difficult to see that the intervention of
intermediaries may drastically alter the economic positions of the re-
spective principals. The complexity of the issue and its relevance in
assessing the financial health of parties to reinsurance transactions is a
subject of great interest to international insurance regulators and con-
sumers of insurance and reinsurance products.
In its simplest form, set-off is "the right which exists between two
parties to net their respective debts where each party, as a result of
unrelated transactions, owes the other an obligation."'  The right to
assert set-offs in the insolvency context is a statutory guarantee; thus, it
may be viewed is a specie of lawful preference, avoiding the fundamen-
following of money through its various permutations and is a process of tracking the genea-
logical descent of the money into its ultimate product." PHILIP R. WOOD, ENGLISH AND
INTERNATIONAL SET-OFF 476 (1989). For a general discussion of the common law and equi-
table rights to trace, see BOWSTEAD, supra note 34, art. 93.
91. BUTLER & MERKIN, supra note 30, D.3.4-06.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Ralph R. Mabey, Setoff in a Non-Insurance Commercial Setting 1 (1989) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
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tal insolvency policy that unsecured creditors shall be paid pari passu,
by allowing them to set off amounts owed to, against liabilities of, the
insolvent. It also may be viewed in economic terms as a form of
95security.
The Insolvency Rules 1986 contain specific provisions governing
the application of set-offs as follows:
(1) This Rule applies where, before the company goes into
liquidation there have been mutual credits, mutual debts or
other mutual dealings between the company and any credi-
tor of the company proving or claiming to prove for a debt
in the liquidation.
(2) An account shall be taken of what is due from each party
to the other in respect of the mutual dealings, and the
sums due from one party shall be set off against the sums
due from the other.
(3) Sums due from the company to another party shall not be
included in the account taken under paragraph (2) if that
other party had notice at the time they became due that a
meeting of creditors had been summoned under Section 98
or (as the case may be) a petition for the winding up[96 ] of
the company was pending.
(4) Only the balance (if any) of the account is provable in the
liquidation. Alternatively (as the case may be) the amount
shall be paid to the liquidator as part of the assets. 97
Because of the requirement of "mutuality," it is important to deter-
mine the capacity of an intermediary before the respective set-off rights
of parties to reinsurance transactions may be assessed. As discussed
above, the general rule is that at the time a reinsurance contract is
effected, an intermediary is agent of the cedent, not the reinsurer. 9
Assuming this general rule applies, we now apply general agency law
principles to clarify the set-off rights of cedents, reinsurers, and interme-
diaries.
95. See Stephen W. Schwab et al., Onset of an Offset Revolution: The Application of Set-
Offs in Insurance Insolvencies, 95 DICK. L. REV. 449 (1991), for a general discussion of
English set-off law and its historical development.
96. That is, the liquidation of the company. See Insolvency Act 1986, § 98 (Eng.).
97. Insolvency Rules 1986, S.I. 1986, No. 1925, 4.90.
98. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Every agent has a right against his principal to be reimbursed all
expenses and to be indemnified against all losses and liabilities incurred
by him in the execution of his authority.99 When an agent is sued by his
principal for money due, he has a right to set off the amount of any
such expenses, losses, or liabilities, unless the money due is held in
trust.'O° Such expenses, losses, and liabilities would include payments
that the agent is legally bound to make, even though the principal may
not be liable for them.'0 ' Thus, an intermediary's personal obligation to
pay premiums under a reinsurance contract which covers marine risks or
is underwritten in Lloyd's constitutes a liability with respect to which
the intermediary has a right of set-off against money due to the ce-
dent. 12
Regardless of whether the insurance is marine or underwritten in
Lloyd's, a reinsurer has no right to set off any claim the reinsurer may
have against the intermediary personally.103 Moreover, a reinsurer who
reasonably believes that an intermediary is, in fact, the reinsured (i.e.,
the "true" reinsured is an undisclosed principal) is discharged from
liability by payment to or settlement with the intermediary in any man-
ner which would have operated as a discharge if the intermediary had
been the principal; provided, however, that the reinsurer had not, at the
time when the payment to or settlement took place or the set-off ac-
crued, received notice that the intermediary was not in fact the true
principal."° Finally, a reinsured may plead defenses arising out of a
transaction that are personal to it, but not defenses personal to the
intermediary such as set-off, which only the agent can plead.'0 5
3. Funding
The pervasive and controversial practice of funding employed by
intermediaries illustrates the complexity of the set-off question. Funding
occurs, for example, when an intermediary receives a claim by a cedent
for payment of loss, notifies the reinsurer of the loss, and pays the loss
99. BOWSTEAD, supra note 34, art. 64.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 247 n.57 (citing Adams v. Morgan & Co., Ltd., [1924] 1 K.B. 751 (Eng.
C.A.)).
102. See id. at 249 n.73 (citing Cropper v. Cook, [1868] 3 L.R. C.P. 194 (broker, in
accordance with reasonable custom of the particular market in which he was employed,
rendered himself personally responsible for the price of goods bought on his principal's behalf
and duly paid for them; court held that he was entitled to set off the amounts paid in an
action by the principal's receiver for money due to the principal)).
103. See id. art. 85.
104. Id.
105. See id. art. 83.
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before the reinsurer acknowledges the claim. In effect, the intermediary
"funds" the reinsurer's obligations. In the context of reinsurance, fund-
ing may be described as "voluntary" or "involuntary."' 1 6 Voluntary
funding occurs when an intermediary pays premiums or claims before
the cedent or reinsurer has paid those funds to him.1 7 Involuntary
funding arises where a cedent or reinsurer informs the intermediary that
it intends to deduct the amount of a claim from the premium which is
due and payable, or vice versa."° In other words, involuntary funding
occurs in situations where a cedent or reinsurer engage in net accounting
without the consent of the other party.
As a general rule, intermediaries have no obligation to fund pay-
ments. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. As stated above,
Section 53 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides that the interme-
diary - not the cedent - is directly responsible to the insurer for the
premium.1 9 Moreover, a Lloyd's custom renders a Lloyd's intermediary
liable to a Lloyd's underwriter for premiums. ° If, however, the inter-
mediary does fund, parties to a reinsurance contract may become indebt-
ed to each other for more or less than the amounts reflected in their
books of account. In order to calculate the precise amounts of such
indebtedness, it is essential to determine on whose behalf the intermedi-
ary acted at the time he funded an obligation.
To date, few courts have addressed set-off issues in the funding
context. Moreover, there' are few statutory provisions, rules, and regula-
tions governing set-off rights among parties to a reinsurance contract
and intermediaries. Nonetheless, certain parameters may be gleaned from
basic principles of agency and insurance law. This article serves only to
highlight -some of the difficulties which may arise when a party to a
reinsurance transaction is bankrupt, although any determination of set-
off rights in any given situation is very much dependent upon the facts
and circumstances.
For example, if prior to an intermediary becoming bankrupt, a
reinsurer pays losses in cash to him, the cedent must bear the risk of
that bankruptcy. The cedent, as principal, is treated as having been paid
by the reinsurer because the intermediary is authorized to receive pay-
106. See Clive Brown, Status and Obligations of Reinsurance Brokers and Intermediar-
ies: In the United Kingdom, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL REINSURANCE
COLLECTIONS AND INSOLVENCY 294, 304 (A.B.A. Sec. Tort & Ins. Practice ed., 1988).
107: Id.
108. Id. at 304-05.
109. See supra part II.A.1.
110. Id.
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ment in cash."' However, the cedent is aided by the proprietary remedy
of tracing because of its agency relationship with the intermediary."'
The cedent's risk thus is limited to the extent to which those funds
cannot be traced. Similarly, if an intermediary's bankruptcy occurs after
the cedent pays premiums to the intermediary, but before they are
passed on to the reinsurer, the cedent remains liable to the reinsurer for
those premiums, unless the intermediary is personally liable to the
reinsurer for payment thereof (i.e., under marine or Lloyd's reinsurance
contracts)." 3 The situation is somewhat reversed in the event that the
cedent becomes insolvent; intermediaries bear some of the risk of a
cedent's insolvency, although they may take steps to protect their inter-
ests in limited circumstances. If, before a cedent becomes insolvent, an
intermediary who is not personally liable for payment of premiums
nevertheless funds premiums to a reinsurer and the reinsurer pays losses
to the intermediary for transmission to the cedent, then, at least at first
blush, it appears that the intermediary is liable to account to the cedent
for the loss payments and must prove in the cedent's insolvency for the
premiums due to him. Howeyer, it is arguable that the intermediary is
subrogated to the reinsurer's rights and that. he may set off the losses
and premiums and pay only the balance, if any, to the cedent's estate."
4
A cedent's receiver is better placed if an intermediary funds loss
payments to the cedent prior to the cedent's insolvency. In that situation,
the receiver may sue the reinsurer and recover the full amount of the
losses owed to the cedent, notwithstanding the funded amounts." 5
However, the receiver would be obligated to reimburse the intermediary
to insure that the cedent's estate is not overcompensated." 6 If the ce-
dent's receiver chooses not to pursue an action against the reinsurer, the
intermediary may find himself in .the unenviable position of having -to
recover the funded losses from the cedent's estate. Any recovery by the
intermediary would be subject to other general creditors' rights to re-
ceive a proportionate share of any, asset distribution." 7
The situation where the reinsurer is insolvent requires a similar
analysis. If an intermediary who is not personally obligated to pay
premiums to the reinsurer (i.e., under nonmarine, non-Lloyd's reinsur-
111. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 90.
113. See supra part H.A.1.
114. See supra part II.C.1.
115. Merrett v. Capitol Indem. Corp., [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 169 (Q.B. 1990).
116. Id.
117. Insolvency Rules 1986, S.I. 1986, No. 1925, 4.181.
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ance contracts) nonetheless funds premiums to the reinsurer before its
insolvency, then the intermediary may seek indemnification from the
cedent for the amount of those premiums."' Also, the reinsurer's receiv-
er may rely on Merrett for recovery of those premiums directly from the
cedent, subject however to the obligation to reimburse the intermediary
to prevent overcompensation of the reinsurer's estate. It should be noted
that Merrett may not apply in those circumstances because the interme-
diary and reinsurer probably will not have established an agency rela-
tionship and because payment of the premiums by the intermediary
constitutes payment by the cedent. Finally, if an intermediary funds loss
payments to the cedent and the reinsurer subsequently becomes insol-
vent, the only party who stands to lose is the intermediary, unless he
recovers those funds from the cedent. In any event, the cedent may
prove its claim against the reinsurer's estate like any other unsecured
creditor. 119
III. U.S. LAW GOVERNING REINSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES
As demonstrated in the Introduction and in Part I of this article,
reinsurance intermediaries in the U.S. are being subjected to an unprece-
dented level of scrutiny. Some of this attention resulted from a 1980
bankruptcy court' 20 decision stemming from the failure of a large rein-
surance intermediary, Pritchard and Baird, Inc. (P&B).'2' Until then,
intermediaries largely were unregulated, since reinsurance was viewed as
a business transacted among sophisticated equals who needed flexibility
to operate in the marketplace. 22 As in England, U.S. intermediary law is
a product of common law agency principles2  and contract.
118. See supra part II.C.2.
119. See Merretn, [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 170.
120. Domestic and foreign insurance companies may not be bankruptcy debtors, see 11
U.S.C.A. §§ 109(b)(2), (d) (West 1993), but reinsurance intermediaries are not insurance
companies and so may be bankruptcy debtors.
121. In re Pritchard & Baird, Inc., 8 B.R. 265 (D.N.J. 1980); aff'd without op. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Francis, 673 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1981); aff'd without op. In re Pritchard &
Baird, Inc., 673 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1981).
122. ROBERT W. STRAIN, REINSURANCE 616 (1980).
123. But see Sheffey, supra note 5, at 930-34 (criticizing application of agency princi-
ples in context of reinsurance intermediaries).
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A. Agency and Sub-Agency
1. Agency in General
Agency is a fiduciary relationship whereby one party, the agent, acts
on behalf of another party, the principal, in dealing with third parties. 24
An agency is created when both parties agree that the agent will act on
the principal's behalf, and subject to the principal's control, for the
accomplishment of some purpose. 25 Agency can be created by appoint-
ment, estoppel, or ratification. An agency by appointment is created
when a principal and agent enter into an oral or written contract for a
purpose. Agency by estoppel is created when the principal's actions lead
a third party to believe the agent has authority to act on the principals'
behalf. Agency by ratification results when the principal subsequently
approves an unauthorized act of the agent. 126 Whether an agency exists
is viewed alternatively as a question of fact or law.' 27
An agency grants the agent such legal authority as is necessary to
fulfill the purpose of the agency. As between principal and agent, an
agent's authority is limited to express and implied powers. Express
authority is specifically granted in the agency contract. Implied authority
is that necessary to accomplish the purpose of the agency but not ex-
pressly granted in the contract."2 For innocent third parties unaware of
the extent of an agent's express and implied powers, an agent's authori-
ty may be extended by apparent authority, which is derived from the
customs of the business in which the principal and agent are engaged.129
124. 1 WEBB, supra note 2, at 33; Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Stewart Smith Intermediaries,
Inc., 593 N.E.2d 872, 876 (I11. App. Ct. 1992). In some circumstances, an agent also may
serve in a dual agency, representing both the principal and the third party. 1 WEBB, supra
note 2, at 42; see, also, Turner & Boisseau, Chtd. v. Marshall Adjusting Corp., 775 F. Supp.
372 (D. Kan. 1991) (attorney was agent of both reinsured and reinsurer) (citing Inland Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 152 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. W.Va. 1957), aff'd 251 F.2d 696 (4th
Cir. 1958)); Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 835 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.
1987) (intermediary held not to be dual agent of reinsured and reinsurer).
125. 1 WEBB, supra note 2, at 33; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 687
(5th Cir. 1972).
126. 1 WEBB, supra note 2, at 34; Aetna Ins. Co., 453 F2d at 687; see also Transconti-
nental Underw. Agency, S.R.L. v. American Agency Underw., 680 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1982)
(unauthorized reinsurer estopped to deny liability for reinsurance commissions owed to
intermediary); Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 1424
(E.D. Wis. 1993).
127. Capitol Indem. Corp., 593 N.E.2d at 877 (question of fact); Turner & Boisseau, 775
F. Supp. at 372 (question of law).
128. 1 WEBB, supra note 2, at 36; Aetna Ins. Co., 453 F.2d at 687.
129. 1 WEBB, supra note 2, at 36.
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2. Pritchard & Baird Decision
As a matter of legal theory, In re Pritchard & Baird, Inc. did not
yield any new rule of agency law, but merely represented application of
well established principles. 30 The failure of P&B appears to have been
the product of avarice. P&B's principal owners withdrew large amounts
of money from the firm as advances on future earnings. The firm subse-
quently slowed payments to its insurers and reinsurers. By the time of
its bankruptcy, several cedents had paid P&B reinsurance premiums, but
P&B had failed to transmit the premiums to the reinsurers. The shortfall
was projected to be in the millions.
The issue was who should bear the ultimate cost of P&B's failure.
The reinsurers argued that P&B acted as agent for the cedents, so that
payments by reinsurers to P&B constituted payment to the cedents.
Seeking to avoid responsibility for the loss, the cedents asserted that
P&B acted as agent for the reinsurers, so that cedent payments to P&B
constituted payment to the reinsurers. Neither side was willing to con-
cede that P&B was their agent, for fear of being forced to absorb the
resulting loss.
After reviewing P&B's operating practices, the bankruptcy court
found that the cedents controlled- P&B and, therefore, held that P&B
was their agent.' 3' Thus was established in the United States the general
English rule - absent facts demonstrating otherwise, reinsurance inter-
mediaries are deemed to be agents of the cedent. Before considering the
far-reaching effects of the decision, this article will survey the general
principles of sub-agency which follow naturally from Pritchard &
Baird.
3. Sub-Agency
An agent may be authorized to appoint sub-agents. Under U.S. law,
a sub-agent performing acts authorized by an assigning agent pursuant
to a reciprocal authorization from the principal is deemed to be an agent
of the principal. The sub-agent can bind the principal for his actions as
fully as if the appointing agent had done such acts. 32 The sub-agent
130. See, e.g., Great American Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 948 (2d
Cir. 1973) (notice of cancellation given to intermediary was deemed given to reinsured); see
also Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 526 F. Supp. 623, 638-39 (D. Neb. 1980)
(adopting the rationale of In re Pritchard & Baird, 8 B.R. at 265.
131. In re Pritchard & Baird, 8 B.R. at 269-70.
132. 1 WEBB, supra note.2, at 37; see also, Blanchette v. Cataldo, 734 F.2d 869, 875
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owes a disclosed principal the same duties as an agent.'33 Thus, the
sub-agent owes fiduciary duties to the principal and is subject to all of
the liabilities owed by an agent to the principal, except as modified by a
contract between the parties. I3
Unless otherwise agreed, the assigning agent is liable to the princi-
pal for the conduct of a sub-agent within the scope of authority delegat-
ed to the sub-agent. 35 However, the principal must seek a remedy
directly against the sub-agent for any negligence or misconduct on his
part.
136
U.S. courts disagree over the agent's liability for the sub-agent's
negligence or default in collecting a fee for the principal where the sub-
agent's appointment is necessitated by usages of business or the fact that
the debtor resides in a distant place. One line of cases holds that the
agent is an independent contractor for collection purposes and is respon-
sible to the principal for the acts of any sub-agent he retains for the
collection. 37 Other courts hold that if implied authority for the sub-
agent's appointment exists and the agent exercises reasonable care in
selecting the sub-agent, the agent is not liable to the principal for the
sub-agent's neglect or default. 13 However, even in those jurisdictions
where the agent may be held liable to the principal for the sub-agent's
default, he may relieve, himself of such liability by Contract with the
principal.139
An agent who pays funds or becomes liable to third persons because
of the authorized conduct of a sub-agent in the performance of the
principal's business has the same right to be indemnified by the princi-
pal as if the agent himself had acted. Thus; an agent who is required to
indemnify a sub-agent because of payments made or losses suffered by
the sub-agent when acting rightfully for the principal, has a right to
indemnity under the same circumstances as if he had acted in person."
(1st Cir. 1984); Stortroen v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Colo., 736 P.2d 391, 395 (Colo. 1987).
Agents also maybe substituted. See, e.g., Turner & Boisseau, 775 F. Supp. at 372.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 428(1) (1958).
134. Id. § 5.
135., Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 F.2d 876, 882 (Utah 1983).
136. Thomas, Wilson & Co. v. Smith, 44 U.S. 763, 769 (1845).
137. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Third Nat'l Bank, 112 U.S. 276, 281 (1884).
138. Wilson v. Carlinville Nat'l Bank, 58 N.E. 250, 251-52 (Ill. 1900).
139. Sanger v. Dun, 3 N.W. 388, 389 (Wis. 1879).
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 133, § 438.
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B. Regulatory Control of Intermediaries
In the wake of Pritchard & Baird, states no longer were willing
to rely on the common law to define the rights and responsibilities of
reinsurance intermediaries. Instead, some states began affirmatively
regulating their activities. The focus of this regulation was the preserva-
tion of cedent and reinsurer solvency. The size and number of insurance
insolvencies quickened the pace of regulatory reform. Viewed as a
whole, the regulations have provided strong incentives for intermediaries
to transact business only with licensed, well capitalized, and prompt-
paying reinsurers. They also are designed to ensure the proper reporting
of reinsurance transactions so that regulators can accurately assess a
cedent's financial condition.
1. New York
New York was the first state to enact legislation governing reinsur-
ance intermediaries. In 1976, the New York legislature enacted Section
122-a of the New York Insurance Code,' compelling intermediaries to
become licensed.'42 Six years later, the New York Insurance Department
promulgated Regulation 98143 to implement the reforms contemplated by
Section 122-a.
Regulation 98 mandated several significant changes in intermediary
conduct. First, it obligates licensed reinsurance intermediaries to have
written authorization from a cedent before negotiating or accepting a
reinsurance agreement on the cedent's behalf, which includes the
cedent's name, kinds of business to be reinsured, kinds of reinsurance to
be negotiated, coverage limits, and effective dates of the agent's autho-
rity. Second, Regulation 98 obligates the intermediary to notify the
cedent promptly of a negotiated agreement and provide written evidence
that the reinsurer has agreed to the assumption. Third, the regulation
guards against financially troubled reinsurers by requiring intermediaries
to inquire into the financial condition of unauthorized reinsurers and to
provide cedents with a copy of the reinsurer's most recent financial
statement.'" Fourth, the intermediary must disclose to the cedent any
conflicts of interest it may have (e.g., an ownership interest in the
141. N.Y. INs. LAW § 122-a (McKinney Supp. 1984-85), as amended by N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 2106 (McKinney 1984). For the text of Section 2106, see Appendix A infra.
142. Id.
143. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 11, § 32 (1983).
144. See Appendix B infra.
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reinsurer). Fifth, the intermediary must maintain books and records
sufficient to permit an audit of its activities, and sixth, the intermediary
must deposit all funds in one or more separate bank accounts (unless
expressly authorized to commingle funds) and be responsible for them
in a fiduciary capacity. Regulation 98 'thus was the first significant
attempt to regulate reinsurance intermediaries in the United States.
2. National Association of Insurance Commissioners
In the 1980s, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) built upon the foundation New York had layed in Regulation 98
by changing the rules insurers must follow in accounting for reinsurance
ceded. This change gave rise to the incorporation into reinsurance
agreements of "intermediary clauses." The NAIC later adopted its own
version of Regulation 98, known as the Reinsurance Intermediary Model
Act.1 45 Both of these changes have profoundly affected the business of
reinsurance intermediaries.
a. Intermediary Clauses
In 1982, the NAIC inserted into its Examiner's Handbook a provi-
sion that clarified the liability of intermediaries to cedents in the event
the reinsurer becomes insolvent:
Credit will not be granted to a ceding company for reinsurance...
where payments are made to an intermediary unless the reinsurance
agreement includes a provision whereby the reinsurer assumes all
credit risks of the intermediary related to payments to the interme-
diary.146
This provision changed the face of reinsurance contracts by causing
cedents to lose statutory credit for reinsurance unless the contract con-
tains a clause placing the intermediary's credit risk on the reinsurer. In
this way, the NAIC carved out an exception to the general Pritchard &
Baird rule that the reinsurance intermediary is the ceding company's
agent. 147
145. REINSURANCE INTERMEDIARY MODEL ACT (NAIC 1993).
146. 1 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS EXAMINERS HANDBOOK
5-9 (1994). The EXAMINERS HANDBOOK guides state insurance departments in establishing
and operating an effective examination system for (1) detecting, as early as possible, insurers
in financial trouble and/or engaging in unlawful and improper activities (e.g., reviewing
annual statements which all insurers must file with state regulators); and (2) developing the
information needed for timely and appropriate regulatory action.
147. Even though this clause places the burden of the reinsurer's insolvency on the
intermediary, it likely does not increase an intermediary's exposure to liability beyond levels
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To obtain statutory reinsurance credit, most reinsurers using interme-
diaries now include intermediary clauses in their reinsurance contracts.
These clauses mandate: (i) that all communications between the con-
tracting parties flow through the intermediary; and (ii) that the reinsurer
assumes the risk of the intermediary's insolvency. A typical reinsurance
intermediary clause provides:
[Intermediary] is hereby recognized as the intermediary negotiating
this contract. All communications (including but not limited to
notices, statements, premiums, return premiums, commissions,
taxes, losses, loss adjustment expenses, salvages and loss settle-
ments) relating thereto shall be transmitted to the ceding company
or the reinsurers through [intermediary]. Payments by the ceding
company to the Intermediary shall be deemed to constitute pay-
ment to the reinsurers. Payments by the reinsurers to the Intermedi-
ary shall be deemed to constitute payment to the ceding company
only to the extent that such payments are actually received by the
ceding company. 4
In effect, the intermediary clause treats the intermediary as though
he were the reinsurer's agent for payment purposes. The significance of
the clause in the context of an insolvent intermediary is readily appar-
ent: the reinsurer bears the'risk of nonpayment. 49
b. The Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act
The most comprehensive attempt to regulate intermediaries is the
NAIC's Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act (Intermediary Model
Act)." Adopted in December 1989, the Intermediary Model Act is
designed to establish minimum standards for licensed intermediaries in
states adopting it.'5'
imposed by the common law. See, e.g., Master Plumbers Ltd. Mut. Liab. Co. v. Cormany &
Bird, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Wis. 1977) (intermediary not liable for insolvent reinsur-
ance company's debt to insured because reinsurer was solvent and authorized to do business
when reinsurance contract issued, and no evidence intermediary knew or should have known
of reinsurer's financial problems); see generally 1 WEBB, supra note 2, at 48-49. As one
commentator indicates, Regulation 98 is more of a reminder, rather than a dramatic revision,
of preexisting legal duties. Tract, supra note 5, at 48.
148. SmTAIN, supra note 122, at 424-25; see also 1 WEBB, supra note 2, at 26. It is
important to note that Webb, et al., erroneously ascribe to Regulation 98 the shift of credit
risk and consequent statutory accounting limitation that are mandated by the NAIC. See 1
WEBB, supra note 2, at 27-28. The shift and limitation are not contained in Regulation 98,
but rather in Regulation 125. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 34 (1982).
149. See Sheffey, supra note 5, at 930-34 for a general discussion of the significance of
the intermediary clause.
150. INTERMEDIARY MODEL AcT, supra note 145.
151. Most states have enacted legislation based upon the Intermediary Model Act: ALA.
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The Intermediary Model Act is a natural outgrowth of the NAIC's
adoption of the standard intermediary clause. Codifying common law
agency principles, the Intermediary Model Act identifies two types of
reinsurance intermediaries: the reinsurance intermediary-broker (inter-
mediary-broker) and the reinsurance intermediary-manager (intermedi-
ary-manager). An intermediary-broker is defined as any person, firm,
association, or corporation who "solicits, negotiates or places reinsur-
ance cessions or retrocessions on behalf of a ceding insurer without
having the authority or power to bind reinsurance on behalf of such
insurer."' 52 Section two refers to the intermediary-broker as the cedent's
agent. An intermediary-manager is defined as a person, firm, association
or corporation who "has authority to bind or manages all or part of the
assumed reinsurance business of a reinsurer (including the management
of a separate division, department or underwriting office) and acts as an
agent for such reinsurer. ,13 Significantly, U.S. managers of U.S.
CODE §§ 27-5A-1 to 27-5A-13 (Supp. 1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.27.670 to 21.27.770
(1993); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-486 (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-62-401 to
23-62-413 (Michie 1987); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1781.1 to 1781.13 (West 1993); COL. REV.
STAT. §§ 10-2-301 to 10-2-312 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-760 (West Supp.
1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1601 to 1613 (Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-3101
to 35-3110 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 626.7492 (Harrison 1994); GA. CODE ANN.§§ 33-49 (Harrison Supp. 1994); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 431:9B (Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE
§§ 41-5101 to 41-5111 (Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 215, para. 100/1-60 (Smith-Hurd
1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-9-1 to 27-6-9-26 (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 521C.1
to 521C.12 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-4501 to 40-4513 (1993); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 304.9-700 to 304.9-759 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 22:1210.20 to 22:1210.31 (West Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A,
§§ 741 to 754 (West Supp. 1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A §§ 698 to 717 (1994); MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 175 §§ 177M to 177W (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); Mi. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 500.1151 to 500.1171 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60A.70 to 60A.756 (West
Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 83-19-201 to 83-19-221 (Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 375.1152 (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-2-1701 to 33-2-1709 (1993);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-5601 to 44-5613 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402-F:1 to 402-
F:ll (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:22E-1 to 17:22E-23 (West 1994); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59A-12D-1 to 59A-12D-12 .(Michie Supp. 1994); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2106 (McKinney
1985 & Supp. 1995) AB 5740, SB 2601; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-9-2 to 58-9-26 (1994); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-31.1-01 to 26.1-31.1-12 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3905.86; OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 5101-5113 (Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 744.800-820
(1993); PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 40 §§ 321.1-.10 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-52-1 to 27-
52-13 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-46-10 to 38-46-120 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1993); S.D.
CODIFED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-14-24 to 58-14-42 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-6-801
to 56-6-812 (1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 21.07-7 (Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 31A-23-701 to 31A-23-709 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 §§ 4815-4824 (1993 & Supp.
1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-1846 to 38.2-1857 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN.
§§ 48.94.005 to 48.94.901 (West Supp. 1994-95); W. VA. CODE §§ 33-38-1 to 33-38-13
(Supp. 1994); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 628.49 (Supp. 1994); WYo. STAT. §§ 26-47-101 to 26-47-
113 (Supp. 1994).
152. INTERMEDIARY MODEL ACT, supra note 145, § 2(F) (emphasis added).
153. Id. § 2(G) (emphasis added). Two states also permit the reinsurance intermediary-
broker or manager to act as an adjuster on the cedent's or reinsurer's behalf. See ALA. CODE
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branches of alien reinsurers and managers of groups, associations, pools,
or organizations of insurers that engage in joint underwriting of reinsur-
ance are specifically excluded from the definition of intermediary-man-
ager. "
The Intermediary Model Act regulates the content of contracts
entered into between reinsurance intermediaries and their cedents and
reinsurers. It requires that transactions between an intermediary-broker
and a cedent be entered only with written authorization, specifying the
respective responsibilities of each. At a minimum, the written authoriza-
tion must provide, inter alia, that:
1. the insurer may terminate the intermediary-broker's authority
at any time;
2. the intermediary-broker will render accounts to the ceding
insurer adequately detailing all material transactions, including
information necessary to support all commissions, charges and
other fees received by, or owing to, the intermediary-broker;
and
3. the intermediary-broker shall remit all funds due to the ceding
insurer within thirty (30) days of receipt. 55
The Intermediary Model Act also obligates the intermediary-broker to
keep a complete record - for ten years after termination of the relation-
ship - of all transactions entered into on behalf of the cedent. A "com-
plete" record includes: (i) detailed information relating to the terms of
all contracts; (ii) the identity of all parties to each contract; (iii) related
correspondence and memoranda; and (iv) financial records. 156 During the
ten year period, the cedent is entitled to access to review and copy all
such records.'57
Similarly, the Intermediary Model Act requires that all transactions
between an intermediary-manager and a reinsurer be made pursuant to a
written contract.1 58 Each contract is subject to the state insurance com-
missioner's approval, and must be filed with the commissioner at least
thirty days before the reinsurer assumes or cedes business through the
§ 27-5A-3, 27-5A-7 (Supp. 1994) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4800 (1993).
154. INTERMEDIARY MODEL AcT, supra note 145, §§ 2G(2), 2(G)(4).
155. Id. § 4.
156. Id. § 5.
157. Id. § 5(B).
158. Id. § 7.
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intermediary-manager. 159 At a minimum, the written contract must
provide that:
1. the reinsurer may terminate the contract for cause upon written
notice to the intermediary-manager, and may immediately
suspend the intermediary-manager's authority during the pen-
dency of any dispute regarding the cause for termination;
2. the intermediary-manager will render accounts to the reinsurer
accurately detailing all material transactions, including infor-
mation necessary to support all commissions, charges and other
fees received by, or owing to, the intermediary-manager;
3. the intermediary-manager shall remit all funds due to the ced-
ing insurer on a monthly basis;
4. the intermediary-manager shall keep a complete record of each
transaction with the reinsurer for a period of ten years after
expiration of each contract;
5. the acts of the intermediary-manager within the scope of its
actual or apparent authority shall be deemed the acts of the
reinsurer.1
The Intermediary Model Act also imposes certain duties on cedents
who utilize the services of an intermediary-broker. 61 For example, it: (i)
prohibits cedents from engaging the services of any person or entity
employed by an intermediary-broker with which the cedent transacts
business (in other words, the cedent cannot employ the intermediary's
sub-agent); (ii) requires cedents to engage only licensed intermediaries;
and (iii) requires cedents to obtain annually copies of each of its inter-
mediary-broker's financial statements.
62
159. Id. The Wyoming statute requires the contract to be filed within 45 days, rather than
30. See Wyo. STAT. § 26-27-107 (1992).
160. INTERMEDIARY MODEL AcT, supra note 145, § 7.
161. Id. § 6.
162. Id. Some states impose experience requirements for licensure. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 21.27.270 (1993) (intermediary must have three years active experience within the
previous ten); Wyo. STAT. § 26-47-103 (Supp. 1994) (requiring reinsurance intermediary
broker or manager must already be a licensed producer). Others require dual licensure as a
primary insurance agent/broker. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 742(4) (West
Supp. 1994).
The initial licensing and renewal fee vary between states. For example, Missouri and
Rhode Island have a $100 fee and annual renewal. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.1137 (Supp.
1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-52-3(d)(3) (1994). Nebraska has a fee "not to exceed $250" and
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The conduct of reinsurers utilizing the services of intermediary-
managers is similarly regulated. For example, a reinsurer may not en-
gage the services of any person or entity as an intermediary-manager
unless such person is duly licensed. 63 Additionally, a reinsurer must
-annually obtain a copy of statements of the financial condition of each
intermediary-manager the reinsurer has engaged."6 If an intermediary-
manager establishes loss reserves, the reinsurer must obtain annually the
opinion of an actuary attesting to the adequacy of the reserves estab-
lished for losses incurred and outstanding on business produced by. the
intermediary-manager.
65
The Intermediary Model Act also enumerates certain acts which
intermediary-managers are prohibited from completing. Thus, an inter-
mediary-manager may not:
1. "[w]ithout prior approval of the reinsurer, pay or commit the
reinsurer to pay a claim, net of retrocessions, that exceeds the
lesser of an amount specified by the reinsurer or one percent of
the reinsurer's policyholder's surplus as of December 31 of the
past complete calendar year";
2. "[c]ollect any payment from a retrocessionnaire or commit the
reinsurer to any claim settlement with a retrocessionnaire,
without the prior approval of the reinsurer"; or
3. appoint a sub-agent.' 66
an annual renewal. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-5610(6) (1993); Virginia has a fee between $500
and $1,000 annually. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-1847 (Michie 1994). Texas provides for renewal
every two years. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.14-2 (Supp. 1995).
Transacting business without a license subjects the intermediary to imposition of various
penalties. The Intermediary Model Act provides for a $5,000 or less fine for each occurrence.
See INTERMEDIARY MODEL AcT, supra note 145, § 1 1(A)(1). Most states have followed this
provision; however, a few have not. For example, Georgia and Iowa have raised the penalty
to a maximum $10,000 fine. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-49-11 (Harrison Supp. 1994); IowA CODE
ANN. § 521C.11 (West Supp. 1994). Delaware raised its penalty to a maximum $15,000.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 1611 (Supp. 1994); Vermont to a $25,000 maximum per occur-
rence. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4822(1) (1993). Maine gives a range for penalties between
$5,000 and $100,000. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 752 (West Supp. 1994). Ken-
tucky allows for the amount applicable to agents. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.9-745
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994). Texas allows any sanction authorized by law. See TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.10 (Supp. 1995). In contrast, Mississippi does not have a penalty
section in its statute. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 83-19-201 to 83-19-221 (1993).
163. INTERMEDIARY MODEL AcT, supra note 145, § 9(A).
164. Id. § 9(B).
165. Id. § 9(C). Incurred losses are the sum of actual claim payments and outstanding
reserves for a given book of business in a given year. I WEBB, supra note 2, at 205.
166. INTERMEDIARY MODEL ACT, supra note 145, § 8.
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The Intermediary Model Act establishes certain rules that clearly
provide protection in the event of insolvency, not only of the intermedi-
ary, but also the cedent or reinsurer. For example, the power given to
the insurance commissioner to require fidelity bonds167 and errors and
omissions policies' for reinsurance intermediary-managers provides
some protection not only to the reinsurer, but also to the cedent, in the
event of the insolvency of the other. In addition, funds held either by a
reinsurance intermediary-broker or by a reinsurance intermediary-manag-
er are required to be held in a fiduciary capacity at a-qualified financial
institution.169 Funds held by a reinsurance intermediary-manager must be
held in separate accounts for each reinsurer represented. 170 California's
Reinsurance Intermediary Act.7 requires separate bank accounts for
reinsurers that are in receivership or deemed impaired by the Commis-
sioner.72 These requirements address the commingling defalcation
problem seen in Pritchard & Baird and in Wishful Thinking and en-
hance the chances that a receiver actually will recover funds held by an
intermediary that the estate is entitled to receive under its reinsurance
contracts.
Similarly, both intermediary-brokers and intermediary-managers are
required to render detailed periodic accounts to their principals, 73 and to
retain and provide their principals access to detailed records for at least
ten years after the expiration of the relevant contracts.' 74 A drafting note
to the Intermediary Model Act suggests that some states may wish to
bifurcate this requirement, lengthening the records retention period for
certain third-party liability coverages and shortening the retention period
for contracts limited to first-party property coverages. Under Sec-
tion 7(I)(3), claim files are the joint property of the reinsurer and the
intermediary-manager, except that they become the sole property of the
reinsurer's estate if the reinsurer is the subject of a liquidation order.
Again, the preparation and retention of such records are invaluable to a
receiver.
167. Id. § 3(C)(1).
168. Id. § 3(C)(2).
169. Id. § 4(C), 7(C).
170. Id. § 7(C).
171. CAL. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1781.1 to 1781.13 (West 1993).
172. Id. § 1781.7(c).
173. INTERMEDIARY MODEL AcT, supra note 145, §§ 4(B), 7(B).
174. Id. §§ 5(A), 7(D). Thus, the Missouri statute requires that records be maintained at
least 23 years after each contract expires for medical malpractice insurance transacted by an
intermediary-broker. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 375.1120 (1993).
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As is apparent, the Intermediary Model Act provides for extensive
regulation of intermediaries. 7 5 Its provisions are intended to protect all
parties to a reinsurance contract from risks of insolvency. To the extent
that a cedent becomes insolvent, however, protection is afforded to its
policyholders and creditors by virtue of the "insolvency clause."
C. Insolvency
Because reinsurance is a contract of indemnity, not liability, 76 a
cedent generally may recover from its reinsurer only for claims and
expenses actually paid by the cedent.'" Thus, a reinsurer could reap a
windfall in the event of a cedent's insolvency, at the expense of the
cedent's creditors; i.e., the reinsurer could deny payment of otherwise
valid claims from the insolvent cedent because the cedent did not have
funds with which to pay its own insureds' valid claims.
178
This result has been avoided by legislation and regulatory policy in
the United States. The rule has been established that a reinsurer is liable
to the insolvent cedent's estate to the extent of the cedent's liability to
its policyholders, without diminution because of insolvency. In the
United States, the rule has been implemented through statutes and
regulations denying cedents statutory credit for reinsurance except where
the reinsurance contract contains an "insolvency clause." A typical
statute having the stated effect provides:
No credit shall be allowed as an admitted asset or as a deduction
from liability, to any ceding company for reinsurance unless the
reinsurance is payable by the assuming company on the basis of
the liability of the ceding company under the contract or contracts
reinsured without diminution because of the insolvency of the
ceding company.
175. Several other NAIC model acts are potentially applicable to reinsurance intermediar-
ies to the extent that they impose requirements on reinsurance intermediaries beyond the ones
already discussed. Some of these requirements are general, such as broker and agent licens-
ing, while others are specific, as in the case of liquidation. See, e.g., THE AGENTS AND BRO-
KERS LICENSING MODEL ACT (NAIC 1969); THE SINGLE LICENSE PROCEDURE MODEL ACT
(NAIC 1987); THE BUSINESS TRANSACTED WITH PRODUCER CONTROLLED PROPER-
TY/CAsUALTY INSURER AT (NAIC 1989); and THE MANAGING GENERAL AGENTS MODEL
ACT (NAIC 1992). A discussion of the overlap and inconsistencies between these model acts
is beyond the scope of this article.
176. See generally Henry T. Kramer, The Nature of Reinsurance, in REINSURANCE 3
(Robert W. Strain ed., 1980).
177. See Allemannia Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 209 U.S. 326 (1908).
178. See Kramer, supra note 176, at 3.
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No such credit shall be allowed for reinsurance unless the reinsur-
ance agreement provides that payments by the assuming company
shall be made directly to the ceding company or to its liquidator,
receiver, or statutory successor, except where the contract specifi-
cally provides another payee of such reinsurance in the event of the
179insolvency of the ceding company....
Similarly, the NAIC has codified the reinsurer's obligation to pay an
insolvent insurer's receiver in its Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation
Model Act.' 80 Section 36.A. provides that "[t]he amount recoverable
from the liquidator for reinsurers shall not be reduced as a result of the
delinquency proceedings, regardless of any provision in the reinsurance
contract or other agreement. 81 To the extent that a reinsurance agree-
179. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, paras. 5/173.2 & 5/173.3 (Smith-Hurd 1992). New York
conditions the availability of reinsurance credit on similar terms:
(2)(a) No credit shall be allowed, as an admitted asset or deduction from
liability, to any ceding insurer for reinsurance ceded, renewed, or otherwise becom-
ing effective after January first, nineteen hundred forty, unless:
(i) the reinsurance shall be payable by the assuming insurer on the basis of the
liability of the ceding insurer under the contracts reinsured without diminution
because of the insolvency of the ceding insurer, and
(ii) under the reinsurance agreement the liability for such reinsurance is assumed
by the assuming insurer as of the same effective date.
... reinsurance agreement may provide that the liquidator, receiver or statutory
successor of an insolvent ceding insurer shall give written notice of the pendency
of a claim against such insurer on the contract reinsured within a reasonable time
after such claim is filed in the insolvency proceeding and that during the pendency
of such claim any assuming insurer may investigate such claim and interpose, at its
own expense, in the proceeding where such claim is to be adjudicated any defenses
which it deems available to the ceding company, its liquidator, receiver or statutory
successor. Such expense shall be chargeable subject to court approval against the
insolvent ceding insurer as part of the expense of liquidation to the extent of a
proportionate share of the benefit which may accrue to the ceding insurer solely as
a result of the defense undertaken by the assuming insurer. Where two or more
assuming insurers are involved in the same claim and a majority in interest elect to
interpose defense to such claim, the expense shall be apportioned in accordance
with the terms of the reinsurance agreement as though such expense had been
incurred by the ceding company.
.N.Y. INS. LAw § 1308 (McKinney 1984).
180. INsURERs REHABILITATION AND LIQUIDATION MODEL ACT (NAIC 1995) [hereinaf-
ter LIQUIDATION MODEL AT]. As model legislation, however, this act is not binding on any
reinsurer unless the state in which a receivership is pending has adopted its provisions.
181. See id § 36. Thus, at least implicitly, the NAIC has recognized that a reinsurer's
obligation to pay without diminution because of the reinsured's insolvency is not triggered by
rehabilitation of the reinsured.
There generally are three stages of insurance receivership: conservation (or supervision),
rehabilitation, and liquidation. In conservation, the receiver takes possession of an insurer's
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ment does not contain an insolvency clause, the Liquidation Model Act
would provide it. 82 The NAIC also has ensured that a reinsurer does not
frustrate the purpose of the insolvency clause by paying the reinsured's
policyholder directly, unless the reinsurance agreement specifically
permits such a payment. 183 The interplay between the intermediary
clause and insolvency clause is significant in respect of, reinsurance
information, premiums, set-offs, and funding.
1. Reinsurance Information and Premiums
An intermediary's duties to promptly transmit funds and communi-
cations between the cedent and reinsurer, and to account for all funds
received or transmitted, continues in receivership. By its terms, the
Intermediary Model Act is not restricted in its application to events that
assets, business, and affairs to conserve them for the benefit of the company's creditors. See,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5/188.1 (1922). This procedure is most often used to
preserve the status quo while the receiver evaluates the company's financial status; e.g., when
the company's surplus has fallen below minimum statutory requirements, but could be raised
to the required amount by an infusion of capital. See LIQUIDATION MODEL ACT, supra note
180, § 10.
"Rehabilitation" has been defined as the "preservation, whenever possible, of the
business of an insurance company threatened with insolvency." People ex rel. Schacht v.
Main Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 950, 952 (I11. App. Ct. 1983); accord Smalls v. Weed, 360 S.E.2d
531 (Ct. App. 1987); New York Title & Mortgage Co. v. Friedman, 276 N.Y.S. 72 (N.Y.
Mun. Ct. 1934).
"Liquidation" precludes the transaction of further business by the company and results in
a final distribution of its assets. See generally ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para 5/187-221
(liquid provisions); see also LIQUIDATION MODEL AT, supra note 180, § 20.46.
182. See LIQUiDATION MODEL ACT, supra note 180, § 36.B.
All reinsurance contracts to which an insurer domiciled in this state is a party that
do not contain the provisions required with respect to the obligations of reinsureres
in the event of insolvency of the reinsured in order to obtain credit for reinsurance
or other applicable statutes, shall be construed to contain the following provisions:
(1) In the event of insolvency and the appointment of a receiver, the
reinsurance obligation shall be payable to the receiver upon demand,
with reasonable provision for verification, on the basis of claims allowed
pursuant to Section 47 of this Act, without diminution because of the
insolvency or because the receiver has failed to pay all or a portion of
any claims. Payments by the reinsurer as set forth above shall be made
directly to the ceding insurer or to its receiver ....
183. See id. § 36.C.:
Payments by the reinsure as set forth shall be made directly to the ceding insurer or
its receiver, except where the contract of insurance or reinsurance specifically
provides for another payee in the event of insolvency of the ceding insurer in
accordance with any applicable requirements of statutes, rules, or order of the
domiciliary state of the ceding insurer.
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occur pre-receivership of a reinsured or reinsurer. Nevertheless, the
NAIC has modified another of its model acts to ensure that the receiver
of a reinsured or reinsurer is entitled to enforce the insolvent's rights
against reinsurance intermediaries. Adopted by the NAIC in 1977,'1 the
Liquidation Model Act is designed to serve as a model for state insol-
vency statutes, in the hope that state insurer receivership statutes will
become more uniform in their provisions governing the rights and
obligations of an insolvent insurer, its receiver, debtors, creditors, and
owners or members.
The Liquidation Model Act empowers receivers to obtain, and
obligates intermediaries185 to provide, information. Section 24.A. pro-
vides that a "liquidator shall have the power. . . (7) To audit the books
and records of all agents of the insurer insofar as those records relate to
the .business activities of the insurer.' 86 For their parts, intermediaries
are entitled to receive notice of an insurer's receivership, and of cover-
age provided by any guaranty association, by first class mail "as soon as
possible."' 1 7 Every agent receiving such notice must, within 30 days,
provide the liquidator with "the information in the agent's records
related to any policy issued by the insurer through the agent (or sub-
agent)."'8 8 Agents failing to provide such information are subject-to fine
and suspensioh of their license. 89
The Liquidation Model Act also obligates intermediaries to transmit
funds to the receiver. Section 37, entitled "Recovery of Premiums
Owed," addresses the issues. of what premiums are owed to a receiver,
by whom, and when. Recognizing the distinction between earned and
unearned premiums,"9 Section 37 attempts to resolve the constitutional
issue of whether an agent can be compelled to pay unearned premium to
184. 1978-1 NAT'L Ass'N INS. COMMISSIONERS 238-75.
185. Although the Liquidation Model Act speaks of the rights and obligations of "agents
of the insurer," see, e.g., LIQUIDATION MODEL ACT, supra note 180, § 24.A.(7), the Act's
definition of "insurer" and the use of the term "agent" are sufficiently broad to encompass
reinsurance intermediaries. See id.
186. Id § 24.A.(7).
187. Id. §§ 25.A.(3), D.
188. Id. § 26.A.
189. Id. § 26.B.
190. "Earned" premium means the "portion of a premium which is the property of an
insurance company, based on the expired portion of the policy period." RUTH GASTEL &
SEAN MOONEY, REINSURANCE: FUNDAMENTALS AND NEW CHALLENGES 101 (1989). "Un-
earned" premium thus means the balance of the premium, representing the unexpired portion
of the policy period. See i. at 107.
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a receiver,9'9 by compelling intermediaries (not including premium fi-
nance companies) to pay only unearned premium to the receiver that is
in the intermediary's possession, as well as unearned commissions."9
Thus, intermediaries are not obligated to transmit funds they do not
have or have not already received. Failure to transmit such funds may
subject the intermediary to sanctions, including fines and suspensions,
revocation, or non-renewal of licensure.' 93 Agents and intermediaries are
entitled to file claims to recover commissions and other monies owed to
them, but they are assigned a sixth level priority for receipt of assets
distributed from the insurer's estate. 194
2. Set-Offs
Traditionally, set-offs between agents and insolvents have been
denied on mutuality of capacity grounds, as the agent's role has been
viewed not as that of a contracting principal, but as a representative or
fiduciary.1 95 Obligations which are fiduciary in nature, such as the
holding of an insurer's earned premiums in trust by an agent, 196 cannot
be set off against obligations arising out of the insolvent's contracts with
the agent. 97 Similarly, an agent cannot set off claims arising in a per-
191. See Hager v. Anderson-Hutchinson Ins. Agency, et al., Civil No. 86-841-E, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13614 (S.D. Iowa July 14, 1989) (holding unconstitutional a statute impos-
ing unpaid premium payment obligations on agents).
192. LIQUIDATION MODEL ACT, supra note 180, §§ 37.A.(2), (3), (4).
193. Id. § 37.B.
194. Id. § 46.F.
195. See generally 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 'I 553.04[2] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th
ed. 1991).
196. Accordingly, § 37.A.(4) of the Liquidation Model Act provides that "[P]ersons that
collect premium ... that is due the insurer in liquidation are deemed to hold that premium in
trust as a fiduciary for the benefit of the insurer and to have availed themselves of the laws of
this state .... LIQUIDATION MODEL ACT, supra, note 180, § 37.A.(4).
The latter provision in § 37.A.(4) is designed to avoid the jurisdictional challenges that
receivers frequently face when pursuing intermediaries and reinsurers to recover premiums
owed to the insolvent insurer. See, e.g., Melahn v. Pennock Ins., Inc., 965 F.2d 1497 (8th Cir.
1992) (Missouri receiver sued Pennsylvania intermediary in Missouri state court under state's
long arm statute and intermediary challenged court's in personam jurisdiction); see also
Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. of Penn. v. KOA Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 572 F. Supp. 962, 969
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). This provision does not prevent, however, an intermediary from removing
the case from state to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). See, e.g. Fabe v. Aneco Reins.
Underw. Ltd., 784 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Ohio 1991). Nevertheless, receivers retain their rights
to seek a remand of the case to state court by arguing that the federal court should abstain
from exercising its jurisdiction, unless the receiver brought the suit in federal court or in the
court of a state other than that in which the receivership is pending. See, e.g., Stamp v. Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am., 908 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1990); Melahn, 965 F.2d at 1497.
197. See, e.g., In re New York Title & Mortgage Co., 23 N.Y.S.2d 303 (N.Y. App. Div.
1940) (set-off denied because relationship between trustees, holders of first mortgage partici-
pation certificates, and liquidator of insurance company was one of trustee and cestui que
trust).
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sonal capacity (such as commissions) against obligations assumed in a
fiduciary capacity.
198
Disputes over set-offs often arise in insurer insolvencies involving
set-off of earned and unearned premiums held by an agent or a bro-
ker.' 99 In most cases, the courts have prohibited an agent from setting
off its obligation to remit earned premiums to an insurer against claims
for unearned premiums or other damages."°° Even if a company agrees
to set-offs by an agent, such an agreement likely is voided by the insol-
vency proceeding."°
Some states have statutes governing the rights of agents to set off
premium owing to an insolvent insurer or reinsurer. Florida, for exam-
ple, allows set-offs in favor of an agent who has paid the unearned
portion of a premium to a policyholder.2 2 Illinois and most other states
do not allow such a set-off:
No set-off shall be allowed in favor of an insurance agent or bro-
ker against his account with the company, for the unearned portion
of the premium on any cancelled policy, unless that policy was
cancelled prior to the entry of the Order of Liquidation or Rehabili-
tation, and unless the unearned portion of the premium on that
cancelled policy was refunded or credited to the assured or his
representative prior to the entry of the Order of Liquidation or
Rehabilitation.203
198. Garrison v. Edward Brown & Sons, 154 P.2d 377, 379 (Cal. 1944) (noting that no
set-off would be allowed for personal claims against fiduciary obligations); Harnett v. Nat'l
Motorcycle Plan, Inc., 399 N.Y.S.2d 242, 244 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (no set-off for breach of
contract damages against fiduciary obligations).
199. See, e.g., Bohlinger v. Ward & Co., 113 A.2d 38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955),
aff'd, 120 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1956).
200. Bohlinger v. Ward & Co., 120 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1956) (court denied set-off of premiums
and rejected agent's argument that the principal-agent relationship between the parties had
been changed into a debtor-creditor relationship through a course of business between the
parties); see, e.g., Sheeran v. Sitren, 403 A.2d 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (agent was
not a debtor or creditor of insolvent, but merely an agent and conduit for premium payments
and refunds, and therefore was not entitled to set off unearned premiums against earned but
not yet paid premiums). But see Downey v. Humphreys, 227 P.2d 484, 490-92 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1951) (agent allowed to set off unearned premiums against his obligations to the insurer
where the court found the relationship between the insolvent insurer and general agent to be
that of debtor and creditor, not trustee and beneficiary).
201. O'Neil v. Burnett, 106 A. 246 (Pa. 1919).
202. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 631.281(3) (Harrison 1983). For an extensive overall discussion
of agents and their statutory duties to pay premiums to a liquidator, see Hager v. Anderson-
Hutchinson Ins. Agency, Civil No. 86-841-E, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13614 (S.D. Iowa July
14, 1989) (holding unconstitutional a statute imposing premium payment obligations on
agents).
203. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para 5/206(b) (1992). The same prohibition is contained
in § 37.A.(3) of the Liquidation Model Act:
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The law on set-off as related to agents, brokers, and other interme-
diaries in the reinsurance context is far from settled, however, and
courts and commentators recently have refocused their sights on the
roles such entities play in the relationship between insureds, cedents,
and insolvents. 2°4 One interesting set-off issue involving intermediaries
arises out of the situation where an insurance company, either cedent or
reinsurer, becomes insolvent while funds paid by the cedent or reinsurer
are still in the possession of the intermediary.2 5 The question becomes
whether the monies held by the intermediary can be set off against other
obligations due to or from the insolvent company. The intermediary
clause .makes the intermediary the agent of the reinsurer for purposes of
receipt of funds. Therefore, while payment of premiums by the cedent to
the intermediary is deemed payment to the reinsurer, payment of losses
by the reinsurer to the intermediary is not considered payment to the
cedent until the cedent is actually paid.
3. Funding
Broker prefunding is another interesting issue beginning to arise in
the context of insurer/reinsurer insolvencies in the United States. If the
reinsurer becomes insolvent before sending payment on the prefunded
claim to the intermediary, what are the set-off rights of the various
parties? May the intermediary set off the prefunded amount against any
claim of the insolvent against the intermediary? Receivers are particular-
ly concerned about the practice of prefunding, as it can effectively mask
a company's financial troubles from both regulators and other compa-
nies.
Case law on prefunding issues is sparse, but one -U.S. court has
Credits or setoffs or both shall, not be allowed to an agent, broker, premium finance
company, or any other person against unpaid premium due the insurer for any
amounts advanced to the insurer by such person on behalf of, but in the absence of
payment by, the insured, or for any other amount paid by such person to any other
person after the entry of the order of liquidation.
LIQUIDATION MODEL ACT, supra note 180, § 37.A.(3). It is important to note, however, that
these limitations possibly may apply to an intermediary only in a liquidation, not a rehabilita-
tion, proceeding. See id. §§ 37.A.(6), E. The reason for this distinction follows from the
differences between the two types of receivership. See supra note 181.
204. See, e.g., In re Pritchard & Baird, Inc., 8 B.R. 265 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1980), aft'd, 673
F.2d 1301 (3rd Cir. 1981); Vincent Vitkowsky, Status and Obligations of Reinsurance
Brokers and Intermediaries in the United States, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
REINSURANCE COLLECTIONS AND INSOLVENCY, supra note 106, at 264; Sheffey, supra note 5,
at 922; Wollan, Caught in the Middle, BEST'S REVIEW, (Property/Casualty Insurance Edition)
Apr. 1986, at 40.
205. See, e.g., Bent v. Alexander, 15 Mo. App. 181 (1884) (agent held $100,000 given
from one insurer to promote the transfer of assets to it of another insurer in return for
reinsurance. Both insurers were placed in liquidation and both claimed the $100,000).
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addressed intermediary prefunding in the reinsurance context. In Ideal
Mutual Ins. Co v. Korean Reins. Corp.,' a cedent in liquidation (Ideal)
sued its reinsurer, Korean Reinsurance Corp (KRC), a South Korean
corporation, for amounts due under a reinsurance contract. Ideal had
obtained an ex parte order of attachment of KRC's account to secure the
damages Ideal claimed in its original complaint, and KRC posted a bond
in lieu of attachment. Ideal then amended its complaint to plead higher
damages and reflect sums that Ideal's London reinsurance intermediary,
Hogg Robinson & Gardner Mountain International, Ltd (Hogg), had
advanced to Ideal when KRC refused to pay the amount it allegedly
owed under the reinsurance contract. Ideal sought a court order of
attachment to secure the 'difference between the bond that KRC 'had
previously posted and the amount sought in the amended complaint.
KRC contended that Hogg's payments to Ideal were gratuitous and
thus irrecoverable. The court rejected KRC's argument, finding that the
relationship between Ideal and Hogg was strictly commercial and that
the evidence indicated Hogg's payments to Ideal were not gifts but were
more akin to advances, which would have to be repaid as soon as Ideal
received payment from KRC. As evidence of the manner in which Hogg
viewed the payments, the court cited the fact that Hogg had filed a
claim with Ideal's liquidator to recoup the advances.
KRC also argued that since Hogg had filed an action against it in
Great Britain to recover directly from KRC the amount that Hogg had
advanced to Ideal, KRC could be subjected to double liability for the
payments. The court rejected this argument as well, citing Ideal's pledge
not to extract a double recovery and an affidavit of Hogg's British
solicitor indicating that the British. action would be dismissed volun-
tarily.
The court specifically noted Ideal's contention that it is "common
industry practice for brokers to pay their clients amounts that are left
unpaid under reinsurance contracts .'. ."' While the court declined to
make an express finding to that effect, it pointed out in dictum that,
assuming it were so, "a rule of law that would allow KRC to escape
payment in this case solely because of the brokers' payments would
provide incentive for other reinsurance companies to renege on similar
contracts in the hope that brokers would likewise, in effect, pay the
reinsurance companies' debts for them." 68 The court's view- seems to be
extreme if one assumes that under the scenario the court posited, the
206. 657 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
207. Id. at 1176.
208. Id.
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intermediary would be subrogated to the cedent's claims against the
reinsurer, and thus the reinsurer still would be liable for the disputed
sums.
IV. CROSS-BORDER IMPLICATIONS
Reinsurance transactions frequently involve insurance companies and
intermediaries located in different countries. 2°9 United States insurance
companies often obtain reinsurance in the London market through their
U.S. intermediaries and "correspondent" intermediaries in England.
These transactions give rise to complex legal issues, many of which
have yet to be considered by English or U.S. courts.
A. Choice of Law
One of the first issues - which jurisdiction's law governs the
dispute - becomes apparent upon an examination of the contractual
relationships that exist between a U.S. ceding company, its U.S. inter-
mediary, the English correspondent intermediary, and the English rein-
surer. Typically, three agreements will govern the rights and obligations
of the parties under a single reinsurance treaty. First, an agency agree-
ment will govern the cedent's relationship with its intermediary. In all
likelihood, unless the agreement provided otherwise, the applicable law
of that agreement would be U.S. law, because both parties reside, and
the agreement was completed, in the U.S.
210
Second, a sub-agency agreement will control the relationship be-
tween the cedent's intermediary and the English correspondent inter-
mediary. Determination of the applicable law of that agreement, in the
absence of an express choice of law provision, may be uncertain. De-
termination of the applicable law of the sub-agency agreement, however,
is essential to understand the various duties of the parties involved. As
discussed above, 1 under English law, the U.S. cedent's rights of recov-
ery against a sub-intermediary - in this case, the English correspondent
209. See, e.g., Trading & Gen. Inv. Corp. v. Gault Armstrong & Kemble, Ltd., [1986] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 195 (Q.B. 1985); In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989),
rev'd, 938 F. 2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom, Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. Cal., 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993).
210. Choice of law remains a vexing problem for courts presented with disputes involv-
ing reinsurance intermediaries. See e.g., Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Calvert Fire
Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1989); Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Ins. Corp of Ireland, 835
F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1987); Meadows Indem. Co. Ltd. v. Baccala & Shoop Ins. Services, 760 F.
Supp. 1036 (1991); J.M.P.H. Wetherell v. Sentry Reins., Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Pa.
1990).
211. See supra part II.A.
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intermediary - are probably limited to foreseeable loss caused by the
sub-intermediary's negligence, which may be pursued in an action for
money had and received. In contrast, U.S. law imposes more onerous
obligations on sub-intermediaries, rendering them liable to cedents for
negligent actions or omissions and imposing fiduciary duties on them
with respect to funds held for the cedents' use. Admittedly, a sub-inter-
mediary's obligations to the cedent likely will be of significance only in
circumstances in which the cedent does not or cannot successfully
pursue a claim against the intermediary.
As a general rule, English law provides that the applicable law of a
contract is determined by reference to the Rome Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual' Applications (Rome Convention), which
became effective in the U.K. on April 1, 1991, as a result of the passage
of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990.212 Although the provisions
of the Rome Convention are fairly complicated, the underlying general
principles are that, in the absence of an express choice of law provision
and in the absence of a demonstration of the parties' choice of applica-
ble law with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the
circumstances of the case, a contract is governed by the law of the
country with which it is most closely connected.213 A comprehensive
discussion on this topic is not within the scope of this paper.
214
212. See Tim Burton, Caught in the Act, INS. INT'L, 1st Quarter 1992 at 28, for a
general discussion of the Act.
Choice of a forum for resolution of disputes is another difficult issue, depending upon
whether the reinsurance agreement and intermediary contract contain forum provisions. See,
e.g., Fabe v. Aneco Reins. Underw. Ltd., 784 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (choice of
forum clause did not eliminate Bermudan liquidator's right to remove case to federal court
pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), (b)). Related to the
issue of forum choice is the availability of arbitration to resolve the parties' dispute. Many
reinsurance agreements contain arbitration clauses entitling the parties to a nonjudicial
resolution of their dispute. See REINARZ, supra note 1, at 17, 59. In the absence of an
arbitration clause in an intermediary's contract, the right of the intermediary to compel
arbitration of a dispute with a cedent, a reinsurer, or their receiver is far from clear. Compare
Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Zimmerman, 783 F. Supp. 853 (D. N.J. 1992) (intermediaries
had no standing to compel arbitration of disputes arising under reinsurance pool management
agreement) and Pacific Reins. Managmt. Corp. v. Ohio Reins. Corp., 935 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir.
1991) (intermediary's right to collect from reinsurance pool members was arbitrable where
intermediary served as pool manager). But when an intermediary has not participated in a
reinsurance arbitration, it nonetheless may be collaterally estopped from relitigating issues
decided there. See, e.g., Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Thomas A. Greene & Co., 709 F. Supp.
86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
213. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature
June 19, 1980, arts. 3.1, 4.1, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1.
214. However, an extensive treatment of this subject appears in BUTLER & MERKIN,
supra note 30, D.4.2-01 to 39, suggesting that a sub-agency agreement between a U.S.
intermediary and a U.K. correspondent intermediary is governed by English law because the
agreement likely will be concluded, and the U.K. correspondent intermediary's duties likely
will be performed, in England. But see Prager v. Blatspiel, Stamp & Heacock, Ltd., [1924] 1
K.B. 566 (location of the agent's residence may provide the applicable law); R. v. Doutre,
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Unlike English law, little "black-letter" authority exists in the United
States regarding conflict of law rules for reinsurance generally, let alone
reinsurance intermediaries. As a general principle, a governing law
provision in a contract should be respected if the law of the chosen state
bears a substantial relationship to the contract, or if application of that
state's law would not offend the fundamental policy of a state that has a
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of
the issue before the court.2 5 In practice, governing law provisions in
primary policies of insurance are frequently disregarded by U.S. state
courts. 6 Although governing law provisions of reinsurance contracts
have .fared somewhat better in U.S. courts than similar provisions of
primary policies, cobrts nonetheless frequently have chosen to disregard
such clauses.21 7
In the absence of an effective contractual governing law provision,
the rights of the parties with respect to an issue are determined by the
local law of the state that, with respect to that issue, has the most sig-
nificant relationship to the transaction and the parties. In determining
that state, most courts employ a "governmental interest" analysis that
considers five "contacts:" (i) the place of Contracting; (ii) the place
where the contract was negotiated; (iii) the place of peiformance; (iv)
the location of the contractual subject matter; and (v) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of
the parties.2 ' The test has proven much easier to state than to apply. In
particular, some courts have had difficulty recognizing the various
interests of potential forum states in protecting the interests of parties to
a reinsurance contract.1 9 Other courts have managed to recognize the
risks of each of the parties to a reinsurance relationship.m
The third agreement governing the rights of the parties is the rein-
surance treaty. Butler & Merkin suggest that the applicable law of the
reinsurance agreement - in the absence of an express choice of law
provision or failure by the parties to demonstrate their choice of appli-
[1884] 9 App. Cas. 745 (agency agreement limited in operation to single market located at
place where specialist agent carries on business takes its applicable law from that place).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFL. OF LAWS § 187(2) (1988).
216. See generally Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga, Reinsurance Conflict. Choosing a Forum
Without Losing a Contract, 55 DEF. COUNS. J., 184, 188 (Apr. 1988).
217. Id.
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFL. OF LAWS, supra note 215, § 188.
219. See, e.g., Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Fortress Re Inc., 616 F Supp. 874 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); see also Martinez-Fraga, supra note 216, at 191.
220. See, e.g., American-Reins. Co. v. Ins. Comm'n of Cal., 527 F. Supp. 444 (C.D. Cal.
1981); see also Martinez-Fraga, supra note 216, at 192-3.
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cable law with reasonably certainty by the terms of the contract or the
circumstances of the case - likely would be English law.22' However,
English courts have raised a strong presumption that the laws of the
country in which the venue for arbitration of disputes arising out of an
agreement is located govern that agreement. 2 Many reinsurance con-
tracts between U.S. cedents and U.K. reinsurers provide that arbitration
proceedings are to be conducted in the United States. Thus, the law
applicable to those agreements typically will be U.S. law.223 However,
there is some authority supporting the proposition that the applicable
law of a sub-agency agreement governs some aspects of agreements
arranged by the sub-agent.22 This proposition has been challenged.2
If we assume that the applicable law of both the reinsurance contract
(which we will assume contains a U.S. version of the intermediary
clause) and agency agreements is U.S. law, and .that of the sub-agency
agreement is English law, then the legal boundaries within which claims
for funds transmitted between the parties may be settled have been
determined; only the result is open to debate.
B. Effect of the Intermediary Clause
If insolvency proceedings are commenced against the U.S. cedent,
the effect of the intermediary clause also must be considered. Under the
provisions of the intermediary clause discussed in this article,226 any
premiums the cedent paid to the U.S. intermediary prior to the com-
mencement of those proceedings are deemed paid to the English reinsur-
er, whether or not the funds were received by the English reinsurer. The
English reinsurer will not have 'a right of recovery against the U.S.
intermediary, but if the reinsurance covers a marine risk or is placed at
Lloyd's, then the English reinsurer will have a direct right of recovery
against the English intermediary. In addition, application of the interme-
diary clause means that loss payments made by the English reinsurer to
221. See BUTLER & MERKIN, supra note 30, D.4.3-10.
222. Pena Copper Mines Ltd. v. Rio Tinto.Zinc Co. Ltd., 105 L.T.R. 846 (1911) (strong
presumption that venue chosen for arbitration provides governing law).
223. BUTLER & MERKIN, supra note 30, D.3.4-24; see also Deutsche Schachtbau-und
Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. Ras Al Khaimah Nat'l Oil Co., [1987] 2 All E.R. 769 (venue
chosen in reinsurance agreement for arbitration shall provide governing law, even where
underlying contract itself is governed by other law); see generally BUTLER & MERKIN, supra
note 30, D.3.4-23.
224. Ruby Steamship Corp. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 46 Lloyd's List L.
Rep. 265 (1933).
225. See BUTLER & MERKIN, supra note 30, D.4.3-10.
226. See discussion supra part HIL.B.2a.
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the English intermediary are not deemed paid to the cedent until re-
ceived and must be repaid by the reinsurer to the U.S. cedent's estate. In
that event, the English reinsurer must seek recovery of those funds from
the English intermediary.
If insolvency proceedings are commenced against the English rein-
surer, then premiums are deemed paid to the reinsurer by the U.S.
cedent after they have been paid to the U.S. intermediary. Thus, the
reinsurer's trustee must recover those funds, if applicable law permits,
from that intermediary, or, alternatively, in the case of marine or
Lloyd's reinsurance, directly from the English intermediary. If the
English reinsurer has paid losses to its English intermediary before
commencement of those proceedings, then that intermediary may be
liable to the U.S. cedent for those funds, either under U.S. law because
privity of contract between a principal and agent exists, or under English
law because a negligence action may be pursued within the limits pre-
scribed in Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd.,227 or in an action for
money had and received. Alternatively, the intermediary clause permits
the U.S. cedent to assert a claim against the English reinsurer's estate.
CONCLUSION
The specter of increasing failures among U.S. and U.K. parties to
reinsurance transactions has focused increasing attention on the rights
and obligations of reinsurance intermediaries. Initially perceived as
facilitators of risk cessions, intermediaries are becoming, at least to a
degree, responsible for ensuring the solvency of their cedents and
reinsurers. New York's Section 122-a and Regulation 98, the NAIC's
adoption of the intermediary clause and recent amendments to the
Liquidation Model Act, and the states' enactment of the Intermediary
Model Act each have addressed various solvency concerns where inter-
mediaries are involved. The effect of these developments on the inter-
national reinsurance marketplace is readily discernable but not easily
measured or quantified. Whether these initiatives will produce mirror
image changes in the U.K. remains to be seen. Thus far, the U.S. insurer
insolvency experience has proven to be an onerous harbinger of a global
dilemma. It is hoped that the recent U.S. efforts to stem the insolvency
tide will be successful. In any event, the practices of reinsurance inter-
mediaries have been changed, and it is now just a question of time
before the merits of the changes can be fully appreciated and evaluated.
227. [1983] 1 App. Cas. 520, [1982] 3 All E.R. 201, [1982] 3 W.L.R. 477.
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APPENDIX A
N.Y. INS. LAW § 122-A (CONSOL. 1977), amended by N.Y. Ins. Law
§ 2106 (1984).
21o6. REINSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES; LICENSING
(a)(1) The superintendent may issue a reinsurance intermediary's
license to any person, firm, association or corporation who or which has
complied with the requirements of this chapter.
(2) Any such license issued to a firm or association shall authorize
all of the members of such firm or association and any designated em-
ployees to act as reinsurance intermediaries under the license, and all
such persons shall be named in the application and supplements thereto.
(3) Any such license issued to a corporation shall authorize all of
the officers and any designated employees and directors thereof to act as
reinsurance intermediaries on behalf of such corporation, and all such
persons shall be named in the application and supplements thereto.
(b)(1) Before a reinsurance intermediary's license shall be issued or
renewed the prospective licensee shall properly file in the office of the
superintendent a written application therefor in such form or forms and
supplements thereto as the superintendent prescribes, and pay a fee of
five hundred dollars.
(2) Every reinsurance intermediary's license shall expire on the
thirty-first day of August next following the date of issue.
(c)(1) If an application for a renewal license shall have been filed
with the superintendent before September first of the year of expiration,
the license sought to be renewed shall continue in full force and effect
either until the issuance by the superintendent of the renewal license
applied for or until five days after the superintendent shall have refused
to issue such renewal license and given notice of such refusal to the
applicant.
(2) Before refusing to renew any such license the superintendent
shall notify the applicant of his intention so to do and shall give such
applicant a hearing.
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(d)(1) The superintendent may refuse to issue a reinsurance inter-
mediary's license if, in his judgment, the applicant or any member,
principal, officer or director of such applicant, is not trustworthy and
competent to act as a reinsurance intermediary, or that any controlling
person of such applicant is not trustworthy to act as a reinsurance in-
termediary, or that any of the foregoing has given cause for revocation
or suspension of such license, or has failed to comply with any prereq-
uisite for the issuance of such license.
(2) For the purposes of this section a "controlling person" is any
person who or which directly or indirectly has the power to direct or
cause to be directed the management, control or activities of the rein-
surance intermediary.
(e) Licensees under this section shall be subject to examination by
the superintendent as often as he may deem it expedient. The superin-
tendent may promulgate regulations establishing methods and procedures
for facilitating and verifying compliance with the requirements of this
section and sections two thousand one hundred two and two thousand
one hundred twenty of this article.
(f)(1)(A) The provisions of this section and of section two thousand
one hundred two, subsection (a) of section two thousand one hundred
ten and section two thousand one hundred twenty of this article shall
apply to resident and non-resident reinsurance intermediaries; provided,
however, that the provisions of this subsection shall be specifically
applicable with respect to non-resident reinsurance intermediaries.
(B) A "non-resident reinsurance intermediary" is a reinsurance inter-
mediary who is a non-resident of this state and is licensed or permitted
to act as a reinsurance intermediary in the state in which such reinsur-
ance intermediary resides and in which such reinsurance intermediary
maintains an office as a reinsurance intermediary; provided, however,
that this subsection shall not apply to any non-resident of this state who
maintains an office as a reinsurance intermediary in this state, or who is
an officer, director, member or employee of a firm, association or
corporation which maintains an office as a reinsurance intermediary in
this state.
(2)(A) Before a non-resident reinsurance intermediary's license shall
be issued, the prospective licensee shall properly file in the office of the
superintendent a written application therefor in such form or forms and
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supplements as the superintendent prescribes, and pay a fee of one
hundred dollars.
(B) Every non-resident reinsurance intermediary's license shall
expire on the thirty-first day of August next following the date of issue.
(C) No such license shall be issued unless the prospective licensee
designates the superintendent as agent for service of process in the
manner, and with the same legal effect, provided in section one thou-
sand two hundred thirty, of this chapter for designation of service of
process upon unauthorized insurers, and also furnishes the superinten-
dent with the name and address of a resident of this state upon whom
notices or orders of the superintendent or process affecting such non-
resident reinsurance intermediary may be served. Such licensee shall
promptly notify the superintendent in writing of every change in its
designated agent for service of process, and such change shall not
become effective until acknowledged by the superintendent.
(g) The superintendent may issue a replacement for a currently in
force license which has been lost or destroyed. Before such replacement
license shall be issued, there shall be on file in the office of the superin-
tendent a written application for such replacement license, affirming
under penalty of perjury that the original license has been lost or de-
stroyed, together with a fee of fifteen dollars.
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APPENDIX B
N.Y. COMP. CODES, R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 32
(REGULATION 98)
REINSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES
Section 32.0 INTRODUCTION.
(a) Section 122-a of the Insurance Law was added by 620 of the
Laws of 1976, effective September 1, 1976 and was amended by chapter
of the Laws of 1981, effective July 28, 1981. Subdivision 8 of section
122-a provides that licensed reinsurance intermediaries shall be subject
to examination by the superintendent as often as he may deem it expedi-
ent and that the superintendent may promulgate regulations establishing
methods and procedures for facilitating and verifying compliance with
the requirements of section 122-a; subdivision 9 of section 122-a pro-
vides that every reinsurance intermediary acting as such in this State
shall be responsible, in a fiduciary capacity, for all funds received or
collected in such capacity, and shall not, without the express consent of
his or its principal or principals, mingle any such funds with his or its
own funds held by him or it in any other capacity.
(b) This Part is promulgated to implement the provisions of subdi-
visions 8 and 9 of section 122-a by establishing criteria, methods and
procedures for facilitating and verifying compliance with said subdivi-
sions.
32.1 VERIFICATION OF COVERAGE AND DISCLOSURE
(a)(1) Where the reinsurance intermediary acts in procuring
reinsurance for a licensed ceding insurer or accepting reinsurance for
a licensed assuming insurer, such intermediary shall have written
evidence from such insurer of authority to procure or accept speci-
fied types of reinsurance, and the scope of such authority.
(2) The written evidence shall be executed by a responsible
officer of the insurer granting the authority and shall include:
(i) the name of insurer(s);
(ii) the kinds of insurance;
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(iii) the type of reinsurance or retrocessions;
(iv) the limits of coverage; and
(v) the effective date and expiration date of the authority.
(b) When a reinsurance intermediary procures a reinsurance contract
on behalf of a licensed ceding insurer:
(1) directly from any assuming insurer or insurers, written
evidence must be furnished to the ceding insurer, that the assuming
insurer or insurers have agreed to assume the risk; or
(2) from a representative, other than an employee of the assum-
ing insurer or insurers, he shall obtain written evidence from the
assuming insurer or insurers of the fact that such insurer or insurers
have given authority to the representative to bind risks in their name
and the scope of such authority. The written evidence shall be
submitted to the ceding insurer.
(c) If the reinsurance intermediary places reinsurance on behalf of a
licensed ceding insurer with an unauthorized reinsurer, which is not an
accredited reinsurer or which has not placed adequate funds with the
ceding insurer pursuant to section 70.7 of the Insurance Law, he shall
inquire into the financial condition of the assuming unauthorized rein-
surer and in connection with such inquiry disclose such findings to the
ceding insurer and make available to the ceding insurer a copy of the
most recent financial statement. Notwithstanding the above, the ceding
insurer may assume the obligation under this subdivision by releasing
the intermediary in writing from his obligations under this subdivision.
(d) Where a reinsurance intermediary acts for a licensed assuming
insurer in accepting a reinsurance contract, the reinsurance intermediary
shall act only within the authority granted by such insurer and shall
promptly notify the insurer in writing of any commitment made on its
behalf. If on a bordereau basis, such notification shall be made at least
quarterly.
(e) No reinsurance intermediary shall procure a reinsurance contract
with one or more unauthorized reinsurers, unless there is provision in
such agreement for the appointment by the reinsurer or reinsurers of an
attorney in this State, as the true and lawful attorney of each such
insurer, upon whom all lawful process may be served in any action, suit
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or proceeding instituted in this State by or on behalf of a licensed
ceding insurer, arising out of the contract of reinsurance.
(f) Every reinsurance intermediary shall make full written disclo-
sure, at the time of negotiations, to the parties to any reinsurance trans-
actions, of:
(1) any control over such intermediary by, or any control by
such intermediary over any of the parties to or any other reinsurance
intermediary involved in said transaction and/or any retrocessions
placed by the intermediary affecting said transaction. For purposes
of this paragraph, control means the possession directly or indirectly
of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
policies of such party, whether through the ownership of voting
securities, by contract other than commercial contract for goods or
nonmanagement services, or otherwise. Control shall be presumed to
exist if any person directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds
with the power to vote 10 percent or more of the voting securities
of any other person; provided that no person shall be deemed to
control another person solely by reason of his being an officer of
such other person;
(2) any retrocessions placed by the intermediary, directly or
indirectly, in connection with said transaction including the identity
of such retrocessionnaires; and
(3) the commissions earned or expected to be earned by the
reinsurance intermediary, directly or indirectly, in connection with
any retrocessions applicable to the original reinsurance transaction.
Such reinsurance intermediary shall amend the original disclosure to
reflect any additions involving paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of this subdivi-
sion as they may occur.
32.2 BOOKS AND RECORDS OF REINSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES.
(a) For at least 10 years after expiration of each contract of rein-
surance transacted by a reinsurance intermediary, such reinsurance
intermediary shall keep a complete record for each transaction showing:
(1) the type of contract, limits, underwriting restrictions, classes
of risks and territory;
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(2) period of coverage, including effective and expiration dates,
cancellation provisions and notice required of cancellation, and
disposition of outstanding reserves on covered risks;
(3) reporting and settlement requirements of balances;
(4) rate used to compute the reinsurance premium;
(5) names and addresses of insurers;
(6) rates of all reinsurance commissions, including the com-
missions on any retrocessions handled by the intermediary;
(7) related correspondence and memos;
(8) proof of placement;
(9) details regarding retrocessions handled by the intermediary,
including the identity of retrocessionnaires and their percentage of
each contract assumed;
(10) financial records, including but not limited to premium and
loss accounts; and
(11) copies of the evidence required under section 32.1 (b)(1)-(2)
of this Part.
32.3 FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY OF REINSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES.
(a) Every person, firm, association or corporation acting as
reinsurance intermediary in this State, is responsible as a fiduciary for
funds received by such reinsurance intermediary, in such capacity. All
such funds shall be held in accordance with the following rules:
(1) A reinsurance intermediary shall deposit funds received in
one or more appropriately identified accounts in a bank or banks
duly authorized to do business in this State, from which no with-
drawals shall be made except as hereinafter specified (any such
account is hereinafter referred to as "a premium, and loss account").
A licensed nonresident reinsurance intermediary may use a bank not
authorized to do business in this State, provided such bank is a
member of the Federal Reserve System.
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(2) Deposits in a premium and loss account in excess of aggre-
gate funds received but not remitted may be made to maintain a
minimum balance, to guarantee the adequacy of the account, or to
pay funds due but uncollected (any deposit is hereinafter referred to
as "a voluntary deposit").
(3) No withdrawals from a premium and loss account shall be
permitted except as follows: for payment or return of premiums,
commission due others, losses to insurers or other parties entitled
thereto, interest, if the principals have consented thereto in writing,
the intermediary's commissions, and voluntary deposits, provided
that no withdrawal of voluntary deposits may be made if the balance
remaining in the premium and loss account thereafter is less than
aggregate net premiums, commissions due others and losses received
but not remitted. In computing aggregate net premiums, offsets from
different principals shall not be permitted,
(4) Deposit of a premium in a premium and loss account shall
not be construed as a commingling of the net premium and of the
commission portion of the premium.
(5) In the case of a reinsurance intermediary dealing with more
than one insurer, maintenance at all times in one or more premium
and loss accounts of at least the net balance of funds received but
not remitted shall be construed as compliance with this Part, pro-
vided that the funds so held for each such principal are reasonably
ascertainable from the books of accounts and records of such rein-
surance intermediary.
(b) Except as hereinabove provided, a reinsurance intermediary shall
not commingle any premium or loss funds received or collected in such
capacity with its own funds or with funds held by it as insurance agent,
insurance broker or in any other capacity.
32.4 GENERAL PROVISIONS.
(a) The term reinsurance as used in this Part shall apply to all forms
of reinsurance coverage.
(b) Before a ceding insurer of its representative pays any premiums
or fees to any reinsurance intermediary, such ceding insurer shall obtain
evidence that the requirements of section 32.1 (a)-(c), (e)-(f) of this
Part have been complied with.
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(c) The provisions of this Part apply to any person, firm, association
or corporation acting as a reinsurance intermediary in this State.
(d) In the case of an insurance agent or insurance broker acting as a
reinsurance intermediary in this State, such insurance agent or insurance
broker shall be required to maintain a premium and loss account(s)
separate from its premium account(s), required pursuant to Regulation
29 (11 NYCRR Part 20)
(e) The provisions of this Part shall not apply to:
(1) the manager of a group, association or organization of
insurers which engage in joint underwriting or joint reinsurance
pursuant to the provisions of section 186-a of the Insurance Law,
provided, such manager applies to and is granted an exemption by
the superintendent; and
(2) underwriting managers designated by Underwriting Members
of the New York Insurance Exchange, Inc., provided that:
(i) such designation shall have been filed with the New
York Insurance Exchange, Inc. in its register of Ap-
proved Underwriting Managers;
(ii) the New York Insurance Exchange, Inc. adopts rules to
accomplish the intent and purposes of this Part; and
(iii) this exemption shall not apply to any retrocessions
handled by such underwriting manager of the New
York Insurance Exchange, Inc.
(f) If any provision of this Part or the application thereof to any
person or circumstances is held unauthorized by law, the remainder of
this Part and the application of such provision to other persons or cir-
cumstances shall not be affected thereby.
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